

“An idea whose time has come”

**Middle Powers as Norm Entrepreneurs:
Comparative Diplomatic Strategies for the
Promotion of the Norm of Nuclear Disarmament**

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my dearest Pop. I cherish the memories of the time we spent together and the lessons you taught me. You continue to be an inspiration and the star I chart my course by. I will always appreciate your guidance, support and unconditional love.

And for E., for a life is not lost in vain. Violence has no place in this world.

Abstract

The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) has been widely noted for its contribution to 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The NAC played a bridge-building role to negotiate a consensus between the nuclear weapons states (NWS) and the non-aligned movement (NAM). While the outcome, document known as the *13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament* is a significant achievement, it is the coalition strategy employed by the middle power states that is the most important contribution to the study of nuclear disarmament diplomacy.

This research proposes that middle power states, such as those involved in the NAC, are effective advocates of the emerging international norm of nuclear disarmament when acting in coalition with other like-minded middle powers. This research aims to test the capacity of these states to develop the case for nuclear disarmament, persuasively reject or rebut opposing arguments, and constrain the nuclear policies of more powerful states. This thesis holds that the NAC is one example of a larger trend in international disarmament diplomacy of using middle power coalitions to generate disarmament momentum. The middle power coalition approach is identifiable in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons disarmament efforts as well as in the antipersonnel landmines, small arms and light weapons, and cluster munitions disarmament processes.

Martha Finnemore and Katherine Sikkink's 'norm life cycle' in *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change* provides a mechanism which can be used to explain how new international norms can develop and is therefore, an appropriate frame of reference as nuclear disarmament is best characterised as an emerging international norm. Analysis of the case studies is made possible by integrating the outcomes of the theoretical discussion into a template of moderator variables. These variables determine the strength of the relationship between use of the coalition approach and the impact of middle powers as disarmament norm entrepreneurs.

Middle power states that employ the coalition approach have adopted a variety of strategies including state-sponsored and state-led efforts, making extensive use of non-governmental partnerships. This research establishes the factors that contribute to successful middle power coalition disarmament advocacy, the international conditions in which these coalitions are likely to be successful and the capacity of the states involved to mitigate and respond to challenges as they present themselves.

List of Abbreviations

7NI	The Seven Nation Initiative
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
APL Treaty	Antipersonnel Landmines Treaty
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CCW	Convention on Certain Weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CMC	Cluster Munitions Campaign
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
EU	European Union
FMCT	Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IANSA	International Action Network for Small Arms
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICNND	International Commission on Non Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
JACKSNNZ	Japan, Australia, Canada, (South) Korea, Switzerland, Norway and New Zealand
MCI	Main Committee One (of the NPT Rev Con)
MNF-I	Multinational force in Iraq
MPI	Middle Powers Initiative
NAC	New Agenda Coalition
NAM	Non Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NATO-3	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Group of Three
NATO-5	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Group of Five
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPT	(Nuclear) Non-Proliferation Treaty
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone

NWS	Nuclear Weapon State
NNWS	Non-Nuclear Weapon State
P5	Permanent 5 (United Nations Security Council)
PrepCom	Preparatory Committee of the Review Conference <i>of</i> the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
RevCon	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SORT	The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
US	United States of America
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMDFZ	Weapons of Mass Destruction- Free Zone

Introduction

The collapse of the 2005 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was the result of a procedural stalemate; however, this procedural wrangling indicated much deeper frustrations regarding the current operation and future direction of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The failure of the conference to agree to an agenda was due to a small number of states that were able to dominate the debate by shifting focus to auxiliary issues.¹ As a part of this group, the nuclear weapons states (NWS) the United States and France, obstructed discussion on the implementation of the NPT Article VI nuclear disarmament obligation.² This unwillingness to acknowledge the agreements and commitments made at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 RevCon compromised the NPT states parties' capacity to address the serious proliferation challenges from Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea in 2005.³ This conference did little to dispel non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS) concerns that non-proliferation obligations were given priority over nuclear disarmament, reinforcing the cleavages that persist between the traditional voting blocs (the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and the NWS regarding the onus of responsibility to implement the requirements of Article VI.⁴ Given the absence of bridge-building states at this forum and the escalating insecurity within the non-proliferation regime, questions regarding the capacity of state parties to reconcile the competing priorities of the two blocs and pursue a balanced approach to the three pillars of the NPT (disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear energy) have taken on a renewed urgency.⁵

¹ R. Johnson, "Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed," *Disarmament Diplomacy*, 80 (Autumn 2005), retrieved August 20, 2009 from <<http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd80/80npt.htm>>.

² J. Cirincione, "Failure in New York," *Nuclear Policy: Proliferation Analysis*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (June 7, 2005), retrieved June 23, 2009 from <<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17042>>., and H. Muller, "The 2005 NPT Review Conference: Reasons and Consequences of Failure and Options for Repair," *Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Paper no 31*, Stockholm, Sweden (August 2005), p. 6, retrieved September 12, 2009 from <<http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No31.pdf>>.

³ J. Cirincione, "Failure in New York".

⁴ The implementation of Article VI involves reducing the level of armaments and reliance on these weapons in security policies; yet, as states such as the NWS argue, it is just as necessary to implement the conditions that would enable such reductions to have a positive impact on international security.

⁵ This insecurity stems from the prospect of nuclear terrorism, the high operational readiness levels and the offensive nuclear postures maintained by the NWS. W. Potter, P. Lewis, G. Mukhatzhanova, and M. Pomper, *The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Deconstructing Consensus*, CNS Special Report (June 17, 2010), James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, p. 11, retrieved August 8, 2010 from <cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/100617_npt_2010_summary.pdf>

The bridging the nuclear disarmament divide

It is in this context the New Agenda Coalition's (NAC) contribution to the 2000 RevCon is significant. The NAC, comprised of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden,⁶ catalysed a diplomatic breakthrough to produce a consensus outcome known as the *13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament* (13 Steps). This coalition took advantage of the heightened tensions and increased expectations held by many parties and observers in the lead up to the 2000 RevCon. The NAC negotiated a consensus between the NWS and the NAM by providing a policy bridge that spanned the politicised disarmament divide. While the 'success' of this coalition was ultimately short-lived and many of the 13 Steps are now out of date, as an effective negotiating nexus in 2000, the NAC demonstrated the potential for a diplomatic resolution to the disarmament dilemma. While the 2005 RevCon breakdown cannot be attributed to the absence the NAC alone, no state or group of states was able to provide viable forward-looking strategies or unite the majority of states around a middle ground.

It is the contribution of this coalition to the 2000 outcome that has provided the impetus for the research in this thesis. This research will consider whether middle power states such as those involved in the NAC are effective advocates of the emerging international norm of nuclear disarmament when acting in coalition with other like-minded middle powers. The following chapters will consider the factors that contribute to, or constrain middle power disarmament diplomacy and the impact of the middle power coalition in determining the success of norm advocacy.⁷

Middle power coalitions and disarmament advocacy

Notwithstanding the limitations of the NAC, an exploration of the diplomatic strategies employed by middle power states has real potential to make a significant contribution to the study of nuclear disarmament diplomacy. This middle power coalition challenged the

⁶ Slovenia was initially a party to the coalition but withdrew in 1998 citing NATO pressures. R. Green, *Fast Track to Zero Nuclear Weapons: the Middle Powers Initiative*, The Middle Powers Initiative: Cambridge, Massachusetts (1998), p. 12.

⁷ See C. Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, MacMillan: London, (1984) and C. Pratt, *Middle Power Internationalism: The north-south dimension*, Kingston & Montreal: McGill- Queen's University Press, (1990) as early examples of the use of the term 'middle power' in academic literature; however, the term has been in common usage in foreign policy discourse since the end of World War II.

commonly held view that “the powerful do as they will and the weak do as they must.”⁸ Andrew F. Cooper has suggested that middle powers states have received significant attention as these states have increasingly become active leaders in the development of normative agendas in selected areas where they have specialised interests and task related experience.⁹ Despite the fact that the foreign policies of the great powers continue to dominate and shape the international system, that these states are no longer the “only source of initiative in the international order.”¹⁰ This research will focus on a core group of middle power states which have repeatedly demonstrated a capacity to tailor their collective diplomatic actions to take advantage of the opportunities provided by negotiated regimes and institutions, advancing their collective agenda by exerting an influence that is far beyond the individual capacity of each state.¹¹ Middle power states are most often noted as having achieved significant success in ‘second and third agenda’ items including economic, environmental and human rights issues.¹² More importantly though, these states have also been active in ‘humanitarian disarmament’ campaigns including antipersonnel landmines, small arms and light weapons and cluster munitions disarmament. Through the skilful framing of the nuclear disarmament debate, this same group of middle power states has also been able to influence the ‘hard security’ issue of nuclear disarmament.

This thesis holds that the NAC is one example of a larger trend in international disarmament diplomacy of using middle power coalitions to generate disarmament momentum. This coalition approach is the most remarkable and innovative characteristic of middle power diplomacy and is integral to the success of a number of middle power efforts to advance disarmament. These states are more likely to be effective advocates for nuclear disarmament when acting as a part of a coalition. Incidentally, these states are motivated to adopt this approach due to the limited resources and systemic constraints they face. Engagement in

⁸ C. Ingebritsen, ‘Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics’, *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 37, 1 (2002), p.11.

⁹ A. F. Cooper, *Niche diplomacy: middle powers after the Cold War*, Palgrave Macmillan: Hampshire (November 1997), p. 6.

¹⁰ A. F. Cooper, *Niche diplomacy: middle powers after the Cold War*, p. 1.

¹¹ See for example O. Young in “Political Leadership and regime Formation: on the Development of Institutions in International Society,” *International Organisation*, 45, 3, (1991) p. 287, regarding the potential for states to exercise of alternative leadership strategies in negotiated settlements. Such leadership is not necessarily derived from than hegemonic or structural power.

¹² A. F. Cooper, R. Higgot and K. R. Nossal refer to ‘second agenda’ items as economic issues and ‘third agenda’ items as the environment and human rights in *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press (1993). See also M.A. Rudderham, “Middle Power Pull: Can Middle Powers use Public Diplomacy to Ameliorate the Image of the West?” *YCIS Working Paper Number 46*, (February 2008), p. 18, retrieved March 12, 2009 from <<http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-02880.pdf>>.

such coalitions provides these middle power states with a competitive advantage as the coalition creates a platform from which to leverage their positions and maximise the utility of niche areas of expertise.¹³ As the unit of analysis, this coalition aspect represents a relatively novel way of interacting with the global power structure.¹⁴ While the role of middle power coalitions has been explored by a number of scholars the conclusions of these studies have not yet been fully explored in the context of nuclear disarmament.¹⁵

Establishing a theoretical framework

Chapter Two of this thesis constructs a conceptual framework to support the central hypothesis that middle power states can effectively promote nuclear disarmament when acting in coalition with other like-minded middle powers. This chapter builds on the wealth of literature on norms and the dynamics of disarmament process and provides a basis for the following research. This research aims to test the capacity of these states to develop the case for nuclear disarmament, persuasively reject or rebut opposing arguments, and constrain the nuclear policies of more powerful states. This chapter establishes a theoretical foundation for this research by reviewing and evaluating the current constructivist literature on international norms and nuclear non-proliferation regime dynamics to explain nuclear disarmament from the perspective of an emerging international norm.¹⁶ Martha Finnemore and Katherine Sikkink's 'norm life cycle' in *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change* provides a mechanism to explain how new international norms can develop and is therefore, an appropriate frame of reference as nuclear disarmament is best characterised as an emerging

¹³ G. Evans and B. Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations In the World of the 1990s*, Second Edition, Melbourne University Press (1991), p. 27.

¹⁴ "Leveraging Soft Power Currency Against Hard Power Weapons: The role of middle powers in the international nuclear disarmament (Interview with James Wurst, Program Director of the Middle Powers Initiative)," *Public Diplomacy Magazine (In Practice)*, 2, (Summer 2009), retrieved December 20, 2009 from <URL: <http://publicdiplomacymagazine.com/public-diplomacy-in-practice/leveraging-soft-power-currency-against-hard-power-weapons/>>.

¹⁵ See for example R. A. Higgott and A. F. Cooper, "Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations," *International Organization*, 44, 4, (Autumn, 1990), p. 589., and K. Rutherford, S. Brem and R. Matthew (eds.) *Reframing the Agenda: The Impact of NGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International Security*, Praeger: Westport CT, (2003).

¹⁶ Recent publications suggest that this is an area of increasing interest. See M. Hanson, "The Advocacy States: Their Normative Role before and after the U.S. Call for Nuclear Elimination," *The Nonproliferation Review*, 17, 1, (March 2010), p. 71., M. R. Rublee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness," *International Studies Review*, 10, (2008), p. 420., and *Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint*, University of Georgia Press, (2009), and W. Clarke, "Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success and Failure," *Hertie School of Governance- Working papers*, No. 35, (July 2008), p.8, retrieved October 2, 2008 from <www.hertie-school.org/binaries/addon/650_hsog_wp_no.35.pdf>.

international norm.¹⁷ This norms approach is valuable as it explains the concepts used in the hypothesis such as the role of norm entrepreneurs (in this case the middle power states) in the promotion of emerging norms through multilateral organisational platforms (middle power coalitions). Norms theory also outlines the theoretical issues that may challenge the hypothesis and provides the theoretical tools to understand how and why middle powers can influence regime dynamics and constrain NWS policy.

Analysis of the case studies is made possible by integrating the outcomes of the theoretical discussion into template of moderator variables. These variables determine the strength of the relationship between use of the coalition approach and the impact of middle powers as disarmament norm entrepreneurs. These moderator variables draw on Warren Clarke's work in *Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success and Failure*, which compares conventional disarmament transnational advocacy networks in the context of norm advocacy;¹⁸ however, these variables also reflect the observable characteristics of the NAC and have been refined through an iterative process.¹⁹ This method has served to sharpen the variable definitions and strengthens the internal validity of this theory. The variables are: (1) the capacity of the norm entrepreneurs, (2) the constraints of the international environment, (3) the characteristics of the issue, (4) the framing the issue and the development of the case for disarmament by norm entrepreneurs. These variables enable controlled cross-study comparisons to be made between the very different middle power coalitions.

Research outline

Chapter three will consider whether middle powers have been effective *nuclear disarmament* advocates and will look to middle power involvement in the NAC. Assessment of 'effective norm promotion' in this context will be based on the capacity of these states (in coalition) to influence a critical mass of states and/or NWS nuclear policy. This example validates but also qualifies the hypothesis as the NAC success is subject to certain conditions. The NAC contribution demonstrated potential but fell short expectations and there are a number of areas where this coalition could have improved their advocacy. The coalition hypothesis is

¹⁷ M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization*, 52, 4, (Autumn 1998), p. 895.

¹⁸ W. Clarke, "Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success and Failure," p.14.

¹⁹ K. M. Eisenhardt, "Building Theories from Case Study Research," *The Academy of Management Review*, 14, 4, (October 1989), p. 541.

supported by the fact the NAC was not an isolated incident, but rather, elements of this strategy have been employed widely to advance the nuclear disarmament agenda. This suggests that there are a variety of diplomatic strategies that are available to middle power states that employ the coalition approach.

Chapter Four considers the North Atlantic Treaty Association Group of Five (NATO-5) as a middle power nuclear security coalition as well as the taking into account the similarity that middle power coalitions have with transnational advocacy networks and international commissions as middle power *state-sponsored* efforts. This chapter concludes that the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), the Seven Nation Initiative (7NI) and the middle power sponsored independent nuclear commissions compliment and reflect core aspects of the *state-led* coalition approach. This chapter highlights the need for pragmatism in middle power diplomacy, given the limited capacity of these states to find and maintain influence in an often hostile normative and policy environment. The success of these endeavours hinges on the capacity of the middle power states to frame the norm and tailor their advocacy to suit the environment; however success is determined not only by cooperative efforts, but by insuring the outcomes of these initiatives against the inevitable limits these states face.

Chapter Five will consider other examples of the trend of using middle power coalitions to generate disarmament momentum in the conventional and (non-nuclear) weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disarmament movements. The middle power coalition approach can be identified in antipersonnel landmines, small arms and light weapons, and cluster munitions disarmament processes, as well as chemical and biological weapons disarmament efforts, lending further support to the hypothesis. Middle power coalitions in the conventional weapons disarmament campaigns have achieved some significant successes, suggesting that in the presence of other political conditions the middle power disarmament advocacy could take a very different course. Chapter Five considers middle power coalition efforts in chemical and biological weapons disarmament which share more similarities with nuclear disarmament by virtue of the strategic nature of these weapons. These examples suggest a different, technical and more pragmatic approach to that undertaken in nuclear disarmament. Lastly, in Chapter Six this research will consider the capacity of individual states to tailor their diplomacy to suit the international conditions and the potential to create develop the conditions that would enable the success of middle power coalition.

Having established the factors that contribute to successful middle power coalition disarmament advocacy, the international conditions in which these coalitions are likely to be successful, and the capacity of the states involved to mitigate and respond to challenges as they present themselves, the concluding discussion in Chapter Seven will address the means by which future efforts could more accurately respond to the needs of current nuclear disarmament context. Ronal M. Behringer suggests that “it may be possible for the middle powers to overcome great power opposition to an initiative through their choice of an appropriate diplomatic strategy.”²⁰ There are opportunities for middle power coalition advocacy to advance the disarmament agenda, as M.A. Rudderham suggests, “this potential is going largely unrealized.”²¹ This trend towards coalition activity has demonstrated a broad spectrum of plausible diplomatic strategies and suggests that middle power states could to assume greater responsibility for creating the international conditions that will enable future nuclear disarmament efforts to succeed.²² Moreover, in more optimal conditions this diplomatic strategy could form a mechanism to broker a much needed resolution to the current disarmament impasse.

This analysis and the subsequent recommendations must be mindful not to attribute more influence than is warranted to the middle power coalitions, or claim greater influence than these state are capable of exhibiting. Therefore, the recommendations aim to extract the greatest advantage out of the resources and capacity these states currently demonstrate. The recommendations will suggest a range, or spectrum of possible options applicable for future middle power activity in the context of current nuclear disarmament dynamics derived from the previous examples which could enable these states to make more efficient use of their resources.

²⁰ R. M. Behringer, “Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda,” *Cooperation and Conflict*, 40, 3, (2005), p. 318.

²¹ M. A. Rudderham, “Middle Power Pull: Can Middle Powers use Public Diplomacy to Ameliorate the Image of the West?” p. 19.

²² Director General S. Kongstad, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Seminar: A Nordic Initiative for Nuclear Abolition*, Oslo (April 15, 2009), p. 4, retrieved May 20, 2009 from <<http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/nucnord09.pdf>>.

Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework

This chapter constructs a conceptual framework to support the hypothesis that middle power states can effectively promote nuclear disarmament when acting in a coalition with other like-minded middle powers. It establishes a theoretical foundation for the following research on the emerging norm of nuclear disarmament, placing this in the context of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Middle power disarmament advocacy is also cast as a part of a broader movement in the international community to disarm certain categories of weapons deemed inhumane or contrary to international humanitarian law. This chapter reviews contemporary constructivist analysis on the non-proliferation regime, revealing the influence of social construction, a key tenant of constructivism, on NPT member states' decision-making. This research explains how calculated and rational decisions are not only shaped by power and reason, but also socially derived constraints on state behaviour. States refer to a number of norms to interpret the complex web of non-proliferation regime political arrangements and treaty law. Current literature on the role of these norms such as non-proliferation, nuclear restraint or the norm of non-use (no first-use) provides insight into the factors that cause NWS to accept constraints on their capacity to manufacture, deploy and operate their nuclear arms. This research has a number of conclusions for the study of middle power nuclear disarmament diplomacy, as similar drivers may influence and possibly constrain the NWS decision-making on the nuclear disarmament issue.

Constructivism

This theoretical perspective is valuable as it provides a lens through which to view and analyse the evolution of international norms including the gradual emergence of nuclear disarmament as a foreign policy imperative. As a macro-theoretical perspective constructivism not only explains the role of normative constraints, but more importantly, illustrates how this normative environment can change over time. This is critical when analysing nuclear disarmament as the observable empirical patterns that signify progress on nuclear disarmament (such as new agreements that implement arms reductions, increased verification or transparency in state nuclear policies), represent a changing relationship between the norms of nuclear weapons possession and international security. The classical theories, liberalism, realism and later variants, are more adept at explaining stable relationships and underestimate the role or impact of new or evolving ideas and norms on state practice, because norms "affect the behaviour of states independent of structure and

material factors.”²³ Constructivists confer upon norms an influence that has often been positioned as being in opposition to these classical theories. For example, Katherine Sikkink suggests that realists dismiss the role of social construction “as marginal, insignificant or an ideological cover beneath which economic groups or hegemonic countries pursue their interests.”²⁴ Ann Florini states that liberals dismiss norms approaches as being determined by factors exogenous to the theory.²⁵ Hedley Bull goes so far as to suggest that there is an antagonism between norms and traditional theories, suggesting that norms, in their logical extreme, are “subversive to the whole principle that mankind should be organised as a society of sovereign states.”²⁶ Despite this theoretical antagonism, analysis of the nuclear non-proliferation regime can benefit from the application of a constructivist perspective. In this context, constructivism can compliment classical analysis by highlighting an additional layer of socially derived information that states take into consideration when constructing nuclear policy.

Norms in international relations

Norms constrain nuclear decision-making as they shape the way individuals and communities view the world around them, subsequently affecting decisions on the most appropriate courses of action. Political norms do not proscribe state behaviour in absolute terms; however, they are powerful tools that impact decision-making and analysis. Norms provide a framework for effective and efficient decision-making by limiting the scope of rational behaviour.²⁷ Edna Ullmann-Margalit suggests that norms enable agents to cooperate and coordinate their actions in situations where the pursuit of self-interest prevents this.²⁸ As agreed standards of behaviour for appropriate actors of a given identity, political norms are technically non-binding, but are, in general, complied with because there is a sense of

²³ K. Sikkink, “Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights,” *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 31, 3, (September 1998), p. 517.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ A. Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 40, 3: Special Issue: Evolutionary Paradigms in the Social Sciences, (September 1996), p. 363.

²⁶ H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press (1977), p. 146.

²⁷ See O. R. Young, ‘The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment,’ *International Organization*, 43, 3, (Summer 1989), p. 371. A norms approach complements liberal and realist thinking, by taking into account strategic and political necessity and tendency towards cooperation, by posing the condition of bounded rationality as a constraint on state decision making behaviour.

²⁸ E. Ullmann-Margalit, *Game Theory and Ethics*, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, retrieved November 12, 2007 from <<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-ethics/>>.

obligation created by the shared nature of the assessment of appropriate behaviour.²⁹ Violation of this behaviour often results in social (or political) sanction.³⁰ States do not comply with norms because they are enforced, “but because they are seen as legitimate.”³¹ Moreover, the absence of uniform compliance does not detract or weaken the norm, but is instead, a recognition that the standard exists, clarifying the status of outlier states, as well as “the steps required for their rehabilitation.”³²

The role of norms in nuclear decision making

The use of norms language is a relatively recent addition to international relations scholarship; however, it is now widely used to explain the socialising impact of membership of international regimes and organisations, and has been aptly applied to explain the relationship between the states and the complex political agreements of the non-proliferation regime. Research on the drivers of proliferation and the motivations for weapons acquisition is valuable to this study of nuclear disarmament. It reveals that the ‘the value and utility’ of nuclear weapons is derived from perceptions of political power, prestige and legitimacy, and the weapons more abstract value as political currency, as much as strategic security concerns.³³ Work on the norms of non-proliferation, non-use and nuclear restraint is critical to understanding the dynamics of the non-proliferation regime, particularly where states adopt policies that appear at the outset to be detrimental, limiting the exercise of state power. In many cases states refrain from weapons acquisition within the regime because (amongst other material and strategic benefits) this behaviour offers international standing. Furthermore, norms research reveals that the influence of social construction (soft power, persuasion and the value of legitimacy) on nuclear decision-making is pervasive, constraining

²⁹ D. Shelton (ed.), *Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System*, Oxford University Press, (2003), p. 11. Dinah Shelton suggests that this distinction is not easy to make, but is based upon the assumption that there are no enforced legal consequences for the breach of a political norm. See also P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, (1996).

³⁰ A. Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” p. 364.

³¹ Ibid.

³² M. Krepon, “George Bunn, The Norm Builder,” *ArmsControlWonk* blog entry, (January 21, 2010), retrieved January 25, 2010 from <URL: <http://www.armscontrolwonk.com>>.

³³ The reference here is to both domestic and international perceptions of political power and prestige. S. D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” *International Security*, 21, 3, (Winter 1996-1997), p. 54, W. C. Potter and G. Mukhatzhanova, “Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay,” *International Security*, 33, 1, (Summer 2008), p. 165., and A. Harrington de Santana “Nuclear Weapons as the Currency of Power: Deconstructing the Fetishism of Force,” *The Nonproliferation Review*, 16, 3, (November 2009), p. 326.

a state's capacity to test, acquire, modernise, expand or use their arsenals.³⁴ The same logic explains why the perception of regime compliance (if not actual compliance), with the Article VI disarmament obligation, is valuable for the NWS, as it reinforces the 'responsible NWS' mantle.

Norms language is the most appropriate point of departure for this research on nuclear disarmament; nonetheless, the fact that norms influence but do not determine behavioural outcomes must be emphasised. The value of this perspective is not derived from a conclusive explanation of how and why states that possess nuclear weapons (or states that rely on them for their deterrent value) will engage in a process of gradual reductions to nuclear zero. The nuclear disarmament obligation (as it currently exists) is a soft law obligation, and operates in a 'grey-area' of international relations as the exact nature of this obligation is subject to dispute. In reality, NWS nuclear decision-making is influenced by a wide range of factors (domestic politics, national security and the international strategic environment). It is a real challenge to locate a theory that has the sophistication to navigate the complicated dynamics of the non-proliferation regime. As Tanya Ogilvie-White has suggested, "nuclear intentions are notoriously difficult to divine."³⁵ The value of this theoretical perspective lies in the fact that political and social norms can in some cases, be a precursor to legal and strategic developments. The influence of political (nuclear) norms increases as states comply with the norm over time, as illustrated by the non-use norm or the nuclear threshold, which have increased in salience over the previous 60 years. These norms also play an integral role in the interpretation and evolution of customary and international law.³⁶ While conclusions drawn from this analysis are vulnerable to dispute, the evolution of international norms provides an

³⁴ For the nuclear taboo see N. Tannenwald, "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo," *International Security*, 29, 4 (Spring 2005), p. 32, and T. V. Paul, "Taboo or tradition? The non-use of nuclear weapons in world politics," *Review of International Studies*, 36, 85, (2010), p. 853. For the norm of nuclear restraint see M. R. Rublee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness," and *Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint*,

³⁵ T. Ogilvie-White, "The Defiant States," *The Nonproliferation Review*, 17, 1 Special Issue (March 2010), p. 118.

³⁶ International law recognises non-binding influences on state behaviour. Norms inform and create new, playing three key roles. Firstly, state compliance with a widely recognised norm is considered as evidence of accepted customary law, or *opinio juris* (that which the state considers binding as law). Secondly, states are increasingly adopting texts that contain norms or statements of obligation, but which are not in legally binding form. These form 'soft law' political commitments (like the nuclear disarmament obligation in Article VI of the NPT), which are reliant on interpretation and political will for enforcement. Thirdly, superior or peremptory norms override existing law and are binding on all states. These norms are widely supported in the literature; however Dinah Shelton suggests that "little state practice or judicial opinion recognizes or gives legal effect to such norms." D. Shelton, *Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System*, p. 159.

important vehicle by which to initiate stronger compliance and enforcement mechanisms (that would contribute to disarmament).

The norm life cycle

Martha Finnemore and Katherine Sikkink's norm 'life cycle' provides a succinct explanation for the evolution of new standards of international behaviour. Finnemore and Sikkink explain the emergence of new norms with reference to the development of the norm 'life cycle.' This theory, presented in *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change*,³⁷ involves three stages of norm evolution: norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalisation. They outline the role of the states involved at each stage of the cycle and the relative influence of the new norm on state interpretation of international obligations.

The norm emergence phase of this cycle is characterised by norm entrepreneurs who are responsible for shaping and framing the new norm. This phase presents a mechanism by which middle powers can influence the development of new international norms by acting as norm entrepreneurs (through multilateral organisational platforms) and in doing so, these states can constrain NWS nuclear policies. These entrepreneurs have strong ideas about "appropriate behaviour in their community" and are critical to the promotion of a normative agenda as they often create the issues or draw attention to them through their active agency.³⁸ In this case it is middle powers who act through organisational platforms to convince "a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms."³⁹ These middle powers seek to convince a critical mass of states to not only support the passive proposition that world free of nuclear weapons is reasonable (in principle), but to actively engage in the disarmament process. Finnemore and Sikkink hold that once a critical mass has reached a tipping point, adherence spreads rapidly through the international community. To reach this point the norm is generally "institutionalised in specific sets of international rules and organisations"⁴⁰ which would be an indicator that the norm is fully internalised by the states party to those agreements. The last stage of internalisation involves the broad acceptance of the norm and is

³⁷ M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," p. 895.

³⁸ Ibid, p. 897.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 895.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 887.

“increasingly institutionalised in international law, multilateral organisations and in bilateral foreign relations.”⁴¹

Disarmament as an emerging norm

This thesis asserts the international norm of nuclear disarmament has not been fully internalised by all states. Although the concept of nuclear disarmament can be traced back to the Baruch Plan of 1946, and was institutionalised in Article VI of the NPT in 1969, the urgency of the obligation is disputed by the NWS (and NNWS states that rely on these weapons as a deterrent). The imperative to implement disarmament has challenged but has not yet succeeded the norm of deterrence and mutually assured destruction, which has remained the dominant and accepted standard of NWS behaviour. In the drafting the NPT, disarmament was a technical and political compromise between the NWS and the NNWS. The NPT neither established the disarmament norm, nor codified an a widely internalised norm, despite the fact that “norms against the possession, acquisition, or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems are traditionally established through multilateral, legally binding treaties.”⁴² While the majority of countries party to the NPT as NNWS have committed to refrain from weapons possession (and have done so in exchange for NWS commitment to progress on nuclear disarmament), this process was given little, if any currency by the NWS before the end of the Cold War. This thesis suggests that disarmament remains as an emerging norm as it has not yet reached a stage where a critical mass of states acknowledge disarmament as a “genuine policy imperative.”⁴³ This factor is necessary to generate the requisite political will to implement policies that contribute to disarmament. This proactive stance is only evident in the foreign policies of a select group of states that act as norm entrepreneurs.

The critical mass

As nuclear disarmament remains in the first stage of norm emergence, it is essential to persuade a critical mass of states before a norm can reach the tipping point and cascade rapidly through the international community. This point is a subject of debate, as the threshold for a critical mass of nuclear disarmament supporters appears to be particularly

⁴¹ M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 900.

⁴² J. Cirincione (ed.) “Appendix I: The International Non-Proliferation Regime,” in *Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, New York: Routledge (2000), p. 283.

⁴³ R. Johnson, “Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed.”

high. This is because of the characteristics of weapons possession (with relatively few, but powerful stockholders), the politics of extended deterrence and the consensus based decision-making in disarmament forums such as the CD. These factors require more than a majority of NNWS to compel the major stockholders to commit to a phased approach to disarmament.⁴⁴ This high threshold is a challenge to the legitimacy of disarmament efforts as the NWS (and those that support extended deterrence) hold a pivotal position, imposing a heavier than usual burden of responsibility on norm advocates. The threshold for the ‘tipping point’ may have to include at least one NWS, and/or commitments from the states outside the treaty that possess nuclear weapons (India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan). This is in contrast to many other international norms which would be recognised to have ‘cascaded’ on a lesser majority, much earlier in the emergence phase.

The logic of appropriateness

Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that the “different social processes and logics of action at each stage in the cycle” indicate the manner in which states will interpret and respond to the norm as it evolves. They make a critical observation that the “completion of the life cycle is not an inevitable process.”⁴⁵ They acknowledge a number of important conditions that must be met before a new norm will be accepted by a critical mass of states. This suggests that middle power disarmament advocacy will be subject to a number of conditions.⁴⁶ They recognise that a new norm will emerge from an existing ‘logic of appropriateness’ defined by prior norms. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen define the logic of appropriateness as “a perspective that sees human action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organized into institutions.”⁴⁷ They suggest that actors in a given political community will justify and prescribe foreign policy to fit collective expectations. This pre-existing normative environment has two important consequences for the promotion of new norms; first, emerging norms will be successful when they are framed by norm entrepreneurs such that they are a logical extension of current behaviour, or when grafted onto pre-existing norms,

⁴⁴ A critical mass may be as high as all the NNWS and one of the permanent five members of the security council, all of the NNWS, the de-facto states and the non-compliant states, before it will be taken seriously by the NWS and cascade through the affected community.

⁴⁵ M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 895.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 888.

⁴⁷ J. G. March, J. P. Olsen, *The logic of Appropriateness*, Arena Centre for European Studies: Working Papers (WP 04/09), p. 5, retrieved November 19, 2009 from < http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp04_9.pdf>.

and second, that there are competing norms which challenge the successful emergence of new norms.⁴⁸

There are a number of factors which influence the potency of a new norm and its successful transmission by norm entrepreneurs to other states. Maria Rost Rublee suggests that a new norm is more likely to be assessed as appropriate if it is linked clearly to an already established value, if it is considered to be most suitable to the context, and if the new norm is consistent with other commitments or values.⁴⁹ She suggests that non-proliferation has been widely successful as it is linked with other strongly held values within the regime. Regime compliance is highly valued for benefits such as access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and conversely, due to potential social sanctions for violating this norm.⁵⁰ In addition, the nuclear non-proliferation regime consists of “an interlocking network of multilateral and bilateral agreements, structures, and relationships, all supported by the NPT.”⁵¹ Each of these formal and informal relationships, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocol or the various export control regimes, supports the prevailing non-proliferation norm.⁵²

The influence of complementary norms

The development of a strong case for nuclear disarmament is dependent on the capacity of norm entrepreneurs to frame the new norm such that it complements current practice in the international community. In this context, valid legal, ethical and strategic arguments play a central role, but on their own, are insufficient to persuade or convince NWS to adapt their nuclear policies. Rather, the strength of the case for nuclear disarmament hinges on the more pragmatic claim that “while nuclear weapons could not be disinvented, their possession, and use— and their eventual elimination— could nevertheless be managed by strong norms and institutions.”⁵³ Middle power advocates of nuclear disarmament must be back this claim by

⁴⁸ M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 895.

⁴⁹ M. R. Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,” p. 430.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 421.

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 425.

⁵² For example, agreements from the Zangger Coalition and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) reflect an emphasis on non-proliferation.

⁵³ M. Hanson, “The Advocacy States: Their Normative Role before and after the US Call for Nuclear Elimination,” p. 59. This reflects the sentiment in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Blix Commission) report which stated that while the weapons cannot be “uninvented but can be outlawed and use can become unthinkable.” The report also states that “compliance, verification and enforcement rules can, with

referring to precedent for such actions and creating new policies that complement this proposition (the creation of an 'enabling environment').⁵⁴ This involves framing both the problem and the policy solutions such that they appear to be consistent with the current behaviour.

It follows then, that nuclear disarmament advocates will increase the salience of their case if they frame the norm as a part of a broader movement in the international community to disarm certain categories of weapons deemed inhumane or contrary to international humanitarian law. These states must clearly reference the legal and humanitarian case for nuclear disarmament which has developed out of the early rules governing the conduct of hostilities and laws of war, the 'just war' doctrine,⁵⁵ and humanitarian law.⁵⁶ Developments include the norm of civilian protection, the move to minimise collateral damage and avoid indiscriminate effects, particularly long-term environmental harm. It is of importance to middle power advocacy that precedence exists to ban the production, transfer and use of specific weapons categories including chemical and biological weapons, antipersonnel landmines, and cluster munitions. Such examples suggest that efforts to regulate, control and abolish certain weapons categories have become increasingly comprehensive in scope and obligation. While none of these examples provide a clear record of compliance, they represent a progression of disarmament treaties increasing in sophistication. Advocates of nuclear disarmament would benefit from drawing on these examples as they demonstrate the sort of realistic disarmament frameworks that can be developed. Advocates would be in a stronger position if they could clarify policy solutions that further diminish the sphere of unregulated activity.

the requisite will, be effectively applied. And with that will, even the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is not beyond the world's reach." "Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms," *Report of the International Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission*, p.16, retrieved July 21, 2009 from <<http://www.wmdcommission.org/>>.

⁵⁴ Director General S. Kongstad, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Seminar: A Nordic Initiative for Nuclear Abolition*, p. 4.

⁵⁵ K. E. Kjellman, "Review: Norms, Persuasion and Practice: Landmine Monitor and Civil Society," *Third World Quarterly*, 24, 5: The Future of Humanitarian Mine Action, (October 2003), p. 958. This doctrine dates back to the scholarship of Cicero (106 BCE-43 BCE); however, literature on *jus ad bellum*, the right to go to war and *jus in bello*, right conduct within war can be found in M. Walzer, *Arguing about War*, London: Yale University Press, (2004).

⁵⁶ Historical examples of prohibitions concerning specific weapons categories include the 1645 Strasbourg Agreement between France and Germany which was the first international agreement limiting the limiting the use of chemical weapons, in this case, poison bullets. Later, the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration prohibited the use of exploding bullets, the 1899 First Hague Conference banned 'dum- dum' bullets and the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, 1949 Geneva Convention prevented the use of indiscriminate chemical weapons.

As Rublee notes, the non-proliferation norm has been reinforced by the many nuclear-related agreements that form the non-proliferation regime. A similar argument could be put forward for disarmament. Nuclear-related agreements currently place operational limits and prohibit nuclear arms deployment in certain geographical areas reflected in the wide application of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ). The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 suggests that agreement is not only possible between rival states and superpowers, but nuclear weapons that can be subject of 'blanket bans.'⁵⁷ Other non-proliferation regime agreements undertaken at a unilateral, bilateral and multilateral level that limit (or prohibit) a states capacity to manufacture, test, supply, transfer or acquire nuclear arms or related technologies also lend support, explicitly or in principle, to the norm of nuclear disarmament.⁵⁸ These limitations culminate in an extremely high nuclear threshold (otherwise known as the nuclear taboo),⁵⁹ recognised as a tradition or norm of non-use (or 'no first use'). Policies that compliment non-proliferation regime restrictions already in place should be more likely to be adopted and considered as feasible.

In addition, the successful conclusion of nuclear disarmament in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa and Ukraine, and nuclear reversals in such as Brazil and Argentina present a clear precedent for larger scale nuclear disarmament efforts. Policy solutions derived from these examples could draw on the reasons why these states choose to invest in security without nuclear weapons, the dynamic of the disarmament efforts, the states involved, and the sort of verification and compliance mechanisms that were successful.

The influence of competing norms

The identification of competing norms is crucial to this discussion as the emerging norm of nuclear disarmament is at odds with dominant non-proliferation regime norms such as nuclear deterrence and counter-proliferation. These opposing perspectives, or rationales, challenge the logic and reason behind nuclear disarmament; however, understanding this competition is critical to more accurately and realistically assess the most appropriate course of action and advocacy. In order for successful norm emergence to occur these opposing

⁵⁷ C. Ungerer, "Influence Without Power: Middle Powers and Arms Control During the Cold War," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 18, 2, (June 2007), p. 401.

⁵⁸ Examples of the non-proliferation agreements include the Partial Test ban Treaty, Nuclear Weapons Free Zone treaties, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Agreement and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2008).

⁵⁹ N. Tannenwald, "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo," p. 34 and T. V. Paul, "Taboo or tradition? The non-use of nuclear weapons in world politics," p. 853.

arguments must be addressed, and firmly rebutted, and logics complementary to disarmament must be emphasised.⁶⁰ Advocates must prove that contradictory or competitive norms such as nuclear deterrence are counterproductive and anachronistic to contemporary security threats and show that arms control alone is theoretically, practically and strategically insufficient to meet comprehensive security needs.⁶¹ The movement to enable disarmament (which refers to the process of gradual reductions to a point of abolition), can be distinguished from the more limited objectives of 'arms control'; nonetheless it should be emphasised that arms control lends support to the position that that certain weapons can face restrictions on deployment levels and on the scope of potential use.⁶² Advocates must also prove that disarmament is neither an absolute nor relative weakening of a states strategic, security or political position. Moreover, the proactive development of disarmament policies is necessary because the maintenance of the status quo in fact contributes to a relative decrease in security. Just as the strength of the non-proliferation regime is derived from the widespread (near universal) support for the regime norms that govern member-state behaviour, conflicting interpretations of regime objectives and different rules of behaviour that apply to NWS and NNWS create uncertainty within this regime environment, further reducing the strength of the three pillars. Such uncertainty is also likely to complicate norm emergence, just as the existence of conflicting norms will reduce the likelihood of a new norms transmission from one state to the next.⁶³

In addition to framing the new norm as a logical product of its environment, entrepreneurs are required to take a proactive stance on policy formation in order to persuade states to align with the new norm. Passive support by middle powers will not be sufficient. Advocates take the characteristics of the issue into account when constructing an argument that references the complementary and competitive aspects of the normative environment. Entrepreneurs must address the political and strategic utility of weapon in question by developing new policies and agreements that can assume the functions previously played by the weapon. When

⁶⁰ Utilising complementary logic includes emphasising the role of disarmament and leveraging it within the promotion of other regime norms (non-proliferation as the pre-eminent norm in the regime particularly through United Nations Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) and even later, 1540 (2004). Additionally conditions need to be placed on other actors and agreements such that they ultimately support disarmament.

⁶¹ C. Bluth, "Norms and International Relations: The anachronistic nature of neo-realist approaches," *POLIS Working Paper No. 12*, University of Leeds, (February 2004), p.32, retrieved December 15, 2009 from <<http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/working-papers/wp12bluth.pdf>>.

⁶² W. Clarke, "Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success and Failure," p. 6.

⁶³ M. R. Rublee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness," p. 430.

framing the policy debate entrepreneurs must take into account and clearly identify the causal story, the parties involved and those responsible or liable.⁶⁴ They must also clearly identify where the problem lies (be it demand or supply-side, the causes of insecurity, whether it is a regulation or enforcement issue). The entrepreneur's capacity to be clear and concise in their treatment of the challenges and potential policy solutions will make the norm more plausible and attractive.⁶⁵ This clarity over the issues, policy solutions and rebuttal of competing logics must be integrated into the principled advocacy of disarmament.

Successful norm emergence

Successful norm emergence is characterised in Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle as internalisation of the standard of behaviour, which is accepted as appropriate and no longer the subject of widely contested debate. While Finnemore and Sikkink contend that states could bandwagon with the dominant actors, the core assumption of internalisation suggests that compliance only occurs with 'wholehearted acceptance.' In *Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime* Maria Rost Rublee identifies the additional motivating factors that lead states to comply with (nuclear non proliferation regime) norms, in a way that broadens this understanding and reflects a more politically realistic and nuanced approach.⁶⁶ Rublee's analysis of state compliance, in the case of the norm of nuclear restraint, is based on three subsets of responses to the nuclear non proliferation regime.⁶⁷ She suggests that 'nuclear forbearance' (or compliance with non-proliferation norms) is motivated by three factors: *persuasion*, *social conformity*, and *identification*. She argues that *persuasion*, or the internalisation of the norm, is not the only reason for state compliance.⁶⁸ Rublee states that *conformity* or the reference to social prestige and/ or the avoidance of social costs, and *identification* with important state promoters of the norm can be equally effective in motivating state engagement.⁶⁹

As the motivations for state compliance are more complex than the behavioural outcome (compliance) would suggest, middle powers could craft more persuasive and pragmatic disarmament policy solutions by taking into account the various motivations of states,

⁶⁴ W. Clarke, "Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success and Failure," p. 8.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 11.

⁶⁶ M. R. Rublee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness," p. 420.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 422.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 421.

including the impact of social and strategic influences (such as the prestige value of nuclear weapons), and the domestic and international decision-making environment (including NPT and CD politics). This also reinforces the point that a principled, logic based approach will not be as effective as a strategy that appeals to this broader range of motivating factors.

Middle powers as norm entrepreneurs

This thesis holds that there is a core group of middle power states that are well suited to a role as disarmament advocates. These states occupy a structural position (in the middle of the international hierarchy) which limits the foreign policy options available to them. These states are vulnerable to great power politics and the power imbalances in bilateral, regional and multilateral relationships, and as such, these states are not able to force their positions on others. This asymmetry forms the core motivation for these states to actively seek and support the development of international norms that can constrain the great powers and ensure a more constructive and equitable international environment.⁷⁰ As a concept, the ‘middle power’ state has historically been difficult to define. As a category it has been subject to arbitrary distinctions and semantic variation, resulting in the terms over-use and misuse;⁷¹ however, this term retains conceptual value as a behavioural definition.⁷² In the absence of useful objective measurement criteria, the agency of these states becomes the most important variable.⁷³ Conclusions from previous research, which have often over-estimated the merit attributable to these states, are relevant in this context when brought together to define an ambitious foreign policy standard. This standard of best practice can be used to assess the diplomacy of a self-selecting group of prospective middle power states who aspire or appeal to the values of a ‘middle power’ in their foreign policies.⁷⁴

Previous research on middle power states suggests that they are most effective when exhibiting *activist, internationalist, niche* and *coalition based* diplomacy; however, these tactics are not demonstrated consistently, as these states exert influence only where they

⁷⁰ H. A. Smith, “Unwilling Internationalism or Strategic internationalism? Canadian Climate Policy Under the Conservative Government,” *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 15, 2, (Summer 2009), p. 59.

⁷¹ Semantics of the word middle as medium, mode, mean, or middle in terms of geography or ideology, or based on any other objective measurement- becomes such a loosely defined and amorphous collection of states that term loses all meaning. C. Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics* and J. M. Welsh, “Canada in the 21st Century: Beyond Domination and Middle Power,” *The Round Table*, 93, 376, (2004), p. 586.

⁷² A. Chapnick, ‘The Middle Power,’ *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 7, 2, (Winter 1999), p. 73.

⁷³ M.A. Rudderham, “Middle Power Pull: Can Middle Powers use Public Diplomacy to Ameliorate the Image of the West?” p. 16.

⁷⁴ This definition acts as a population control and helps to define the limits when the findings are generalised. K. M. Eisenhardt, “Building Theories from Case Study Research,” p. 537.

can.⁷⁵ In many cases these states are supporters or followers where the international climate or resource constraints prohibit anything more proactive.⁷⁶ Middle power influence is persuasive, but rarely a deciding force,⁷⁷ and as such, these states tend to rely upon cooperative rather than competitive strategies.⁷⁸ The limited resources available to these states also prompt them to invest in niche areas,⁷⁹ as it is through specialisation that these states can leverage their intellectual capital to their competitive advantage.⁸⁰ Their leadership styles include the development of specialised expertise which has often been characterised as technical or entrepreneurial leadership. These states direct policy development by acting as a 'facilitators', 'managers', 'synergists' or 'catalysts'.⁸¹ The activist and internationalist element in particular, are best illustrated by the principles of 'good international citizenship' (GIC). Gareth Evans has suggested that suggests that GIC objectives, such as principled foreign policy, commitment to international institutions, support for international instruments, are as important as to the promotion of national interests as political, strategic and economic objectives.⁸²

Norm promotion is a logical extension of 'ideal' middle power foreign policy preferences. This is an area where middle powers are likely to pursue active leadership roles, because this will increase their international standing and could contribute to an environment that is more

⁷⁵ A. K. Henrikson, "Niche Diplomacy in the world Public Arena: the Global 'Corners' of Canada and Norway," in J. Melissen (ed.) *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations)*, Palgrave Macmillan, First Edition, (2005), p. 67.

⁷⁶ E. Jordaan, "The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers," *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, 30, 2, (November 2003), p. 165.

⁷⁷ A. K. Henrikson, "Niche Diplomacy in the world Public Arena: the Global 'Corners' of Canada and Norway," p. 66.

⁷⁸ Oran Young in M. Hanson, "Regulating the possession and use of nuclear weapons: Ideas, commissions, and agency in international security politics- the case of the Canberra Commission" in Thakur R., Cooper A. F. and English J., (eds.) *International Commissions and the Power of Ideas*, United Nations University Press (June 5, 2005), p. 129.

⁷⁹ A. F. Cooper, "Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview," in *Niche diplomacy: middle powers after the Cold War*, Palgrave Macmillan: Hampshire, (November 1997), p. 4.

⁸⁰ A. K. Henrikson, "Niche Diplomacy in the world Public Arena: the Global 'Corners' of Canada and Norway," p. 71.

⁸¹ L. Baxter and J. A. Bishop "Uncharted Ground: Canada, Middle Power Leadership, and Public Diplomacy," *Journal of Public and International Affairs*, 9, (Spring 1998), p. 84., A. Hurrell, "Some Reflections on the role of Intermediate Powers in International Institutions," in *Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States*, Number 244, Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, (March 2000), p. 1., L. Neak, "Empirical Observations on Middle State Behaviour at the Start of a New International System," *Pacific Focus*, 7 (1992), p. 5., and R. A. Matthew, 'Middle power and NGO partnerships: The Expansion of World Politics,' in K. R. Rutherford, S. Brem, and R. A. Matthew, *Reframing the Agenda: the Impact of NGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International Security Policy*, London, Praeger, (2003), p. 11.

⁸² G. Evans and B. Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations In the World of the 1990s*, p. 56.

conducive to international cooperation.⁸³ Marianne Hanson explains this further suggesting that rather than merely complying with existing rules and norms, it is in the states' best interest to pursue "innovative and active diplomatic ventures to progress those norms and rules."⁸⁴ There is a natural progression from "a responsible and activist state (to)[sic] formulating proposals to set the direction for international policies."⁸⁵

Organisational platforms

As per norms theory, organisational platforms provide an additional opportunity for middle powers to leverage their limited resources. As middle powers cannot act alone effectively,⁸⁶ however, they may, as Robert Keohane explains, "be able to have a systematic impact in a small group through an international institution."⁸⁷ It is by forming formal or informal (ad hoc) coalitions that middle power states can best exploit the existing 'institutional platforms' as these 'provide political space' and a unique 'voice opportunity' that may not happen in the 'broader marketplace of ideas.'⁸⁸ The term 'coalition' in this context is defined quite broadly to refer to organised, issue focused multilateral groupings. These covers a spectrum of state sponsored activity associated with norm promotion. The coalition approach is identifiable as these are comprised of like-minded states, most often other middle powers. Middle power coalitions can be complemented by partnerships with transnational advocacy networks and as Chapter Three will investigate these coalitions could benefit from the advocacy strategies employed by international commissions.⁸⁹ It must be noted that in the cases where middle powers invest in international commissions or cooperate with transnational advocacy networks, norm advocacy is removed from the purview of the state, challenging the strict definition of the middle power coalition advocacy. Casting this 'net' broadly (and rather loosely) reveals a more nuanced understanding conditions under which middle power advocacy is effective (and where it exceeds the theories legitimate application).

⁸³ H. A. Smith, "Unwilling Internationalism or Strategic internationalism? Canadian Climate Policy Under the Conservative Government," p. 59.

⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 59.

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 59.

⁸⁶ A. F. Cooper, "Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War," p. 8.

⁸⁷ H. White, "The Defence White Paper and Australia's Future in Asia: Will We Remain a Middle Power?" *ANU Podcast Public Lecture*, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, (May 21, 2009), retrieved July 20, 2009 from < http://www.anu.edu.au/discoveranu/content/podcasts/defence_white_paper/>.

⁸⁸ A. F. Cooper, "Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War," p. 8.

⁸⁹ M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Cornell University Press (1998), p. 35.

Coalition building is seen as an obvious route to greater middle power influence, and complements the tendency towards cooperative diplomacy. These state-based coalitions have emerged as a way to counterbalance interests or deflect the preferences and policies of the most powerful.⁹⁰ These coalitions can form vital functions such as renewing focus and momentum on specific middle power issues of concern. These groupings also act as the catalyst for diplomatic efforts, primarily as a microclimate for information gathering and policy preparation. Their activities also include the organisation of meetings, bringing groups of experts together to push the agenda forward.⁹¹ These groupings allow these middle power states to achieve multiple foreign policy objectives, as each state brings a unique set of skills, attributes, reputational qualifications and connections to the group and are effective because the states can leverage their geographic diversity (crossing regional and hemispheric divides). It is the external alignment of each state that allows the coalition to involve key actors.⁹² The economical investment of limited resources in niche areas makes middle powers receptive to working with others to achieve shared goals as they can maximise the utility of their specialisation. The collaboration of a range of actors within these coalitions confers legitimacy on the processes,⁹³ a value that is reinforced by the internationalist orientation, previous experience, and independent foreign policies of the member states.⁹⁴ The value of the multilateral coalition also stems from the international standing of the members and the quality of the output in terms of policy.

With comparatively small, highly specialised foreign ministries, middle powers tend to build close relationships with non-governmental organisations (NGO) to complement and expand their knowledge, skills base and contacts.⁹⁵ This close working relationship with NGOs is conducive to the development of transnational advocacy and research networks.⁹⁶ As such, these coalitions are “well positioned to engage in cooperative public diplomacy by virtue of their substantial soft power and established networks.”⁹⁷ The use of soft power in this area

⁹⁰ A. Hurrell, “Some Reflections on the role of Intermediate Powers in International Institutions,” p. 3.

⁹¹ A. Hurrell, “Some Reflections on the role of Intermediate Powers in International Institutions,” p. 3.

⁹² Ibid, p. 4.

⁹³ B. Hocking, “Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy,” in J. Melissen (ed.) *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations)*, Palgrave Macmillan, First Edition (2005), p. 38.

⁹⁴ M. Hanson, “Regulating the possession and use of nuclear weapons: Ideas, commissions, and agency in international security politics- the case of the Canberra Commission,” p. 128.

⁹⁵ A. F. Cooper, “Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview,” p. 11.

⁹⁶ M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, p. 61

⁹⁷ M.A. Rudderham, “Middle Power Pull: Can Middle Powers use Public Diplomacy to Ameliorate the Image of the West?” p. 19.

reinforces the credibility of the middle powers and thus the influence of their position.⁹⁸ Soft power is effective as states can persuasively frame issues, such that they are conducive to prevailing norms. Their multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy draws on a tradition of similar engagement in human security, peacemaking, economic reform and trade negotiations.⁹⁹ This effort is reinforced by the spill-over benefits in other areas of foreign affairs and trade, and as a welcome by-product, also increases the international profile of the state or group of states involved.¹⁰⁰

Advocacy platforms in the non-proliferation regime

The coalition approach is particularly useful in the context of the non-proliferation regime, which presents a unique set of challenges for middle power advocates of new policy positions. This regime provides few opportunities for middle powers states to exert influence as the institutions are in part negotiated, but also in part imposed upon these states.¹⁰¹

Potential for middle power influence in nuclear negotiations is further complicated by the fact that decision-making and negotiation occurs at two levels, both domestic and international, and deep ideological and political divisions are entrenched by the formal groupings of states, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Western Group and Others, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), as the most influential voting blocks. Unlike their more formal counterparts such as the NAM, these middle power coalitions can be more flexible and versatile both in the structure of the coalition and in their approach to the issues. These groupings are better equipped to remove or neutralise obstacles that have previously hindered progress, particularly the radical states, as these new groups can counterbalance, mediate or bridge the contentious positions.¹⁰² They can also renew focus and keep the process of negotiations on track. These coalitions are particularly useful to promote specific goals

⁹⁸ J. S. Nye in J. Melissen, "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice," p. 4.

⁹⁹ For more information see C. Pratt, *Humane Internationalism*, and A. F. Cooper, "The evolution of Multilateralism in an Intermediate State: The Reorientation of Canadian Strategy in the Economic and Security Arenas," in A. Hurrell, A. F. Cooper, G. G. González, R. U. Sennes and S. Sitaraman, *Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States* Working Paper Number 244, Woodrow Wilson International Center for School, (March 2000).

¹⁰⁰ A. F. Cooper, "Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview," p. 4.

¹⁰¹ K. Colijn, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: a medium-power concern?" *International Journal*, 59, 2, (2004) p. 350. The only exceptions are agreement that offer rotating membership or chairmanship positions. These include the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the United Nations Security Council.

¹⁰² O. Meier, "News Analysis: Bioweapons Treaty Progress Predicted," *Arms Control Today*, (November 2006) retrieved May 14, 2009 from <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_11/NABio>.

without threatening the central alliances or the major foreign policy orientations of target states.¹⁰³

Coalition Strategies

Within this ‘coalition approach’ there is scope for a wide range of advocacy strategies. These strategies are dependent on the context in which the advocacy will take place. It is important that these coalitions are flexible enough to tailor their diplomacy to suit situation. Unlike larger states, which have large, inflexible bureaucracies, with fixed, reallocated budgets, middle powers can move quickly to capture a moment or capitalise on a situation that may arise. Middle power have demonstrated strategies that include an incremental approach, consensus oriented activity, maximalist approach (goal orientated), or in some cases, fast track diplomacy. These strategies will be investigated in more detail in the following chapters.

Methodology: the theoretical template

The preceding discussion has established a theoretical foundation and developed the conceptual definitions that will guide the research in this thesis. It has focused on the implications of the norm life cycle as the mechanism by which new norms may emerge; however, given the breadth of discussion it is both useful and practical to draw together the outcomes of this discussion and create a template of variables that will be used to assess and verify the hypothesis. There are four moderator variables that determine the strength of the relationship between the dependent variable (the effective middle power diplomacy) and independent variable (the coalition approach).

The influence of the moderator variables are determined by a series of conditions which include: (1) *the capacity of the norm entrepreneurs* to demonstrate leadership, to tailor the diplomatic engagement to suit the purpose of advocacy, and to engage with non-governmental organisations. (2) *The characteristics of the issue* also determine the successful promotion of the emerging norm, including the utility of the weapon, the clarity of the causal story demonstrating clear responsibility, and clarity over the problem. (3) *The framing of the issue* plays a critical role in persuasive norm building. Effective framing will be conditional upon the connection of the new norm to clear standard of appropriateness, the visibility of the

¹⁰³ C. Pratt, *Humane Internationalism*, p. 84. The primary alliances of the middle power states will still be with the main powers or voting blocs (i.e. the EU or NATO).

issue on the international agenda, and the clarity of the solution.¹⁰⁴ (4) Acting upon all of these issues are *the constraints of the international environment*. The impact of the normative environment depends on whether complementary norms exist (which increases the likelihood that the new norm will be accepted), competing norms exist (which reduces the likelihood that the norm will be transmitted), or the environment is one of uncertainty (which complicates the advocacy).¹⁰⁵

These variables have been developed through an iterative process that compared the theory to the empirical evidence, with the hope of finding a balance between proscription and reality.¹⁰⁶ The moderator variables represent the most important conditions that influence middle power advocacy. The application of the template enables a controlled comparison of individual case studies across previously separate field of study. The controlled comparisons avoids the development of overly complex and unwieldy outcomes based on the empirical evidence, while the broad scope of cases chosen is more likely to lead to conclusions that are robust and nuanced rather than narrow and idiosyncratic.¹⁰⁷ Such analysis will allow the investigation of implications beyond the immediate cases presented.¹⁰⁸ The empirical evidence has been based on a series of interviews with diplomats, academics and policy makers in Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Norway in addition to primary and secondary sources. Qualitative analysis is best suited to this type of exploratory research and theoretical development.¹⁰⁹ The case studies that have been chosen help to capture the nuances of state self-perception, the states' foreign policy preferences, and the normative impact of middle power entrepreneurs in a way that quantitative analysis would overlook.

¹⁰⁴ Warren Clarke, "Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success and Failure," p. 6.

¹⁰⁵ Maria Rost Rublee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness," p. 430.

¹⁰⁶ K. M. Eisenhardt, "Building Theories from Case Study Research," p. 541.

¹⁰⁷ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, (1997), p. 68.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 52.

¹⁰⁹ R. M. Behringer, "Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda," p. 302.

Chapter Three: Middle powers as nuclear disarmament norm entrepreneurs

“Progress in building the non-proliferation regime has historically depended on the agreement of the nuclear weapon states. But progress does not necessarily begin with these states.”¹¹⁰

Middle powers, independently and in partnership with other ‘like-minded’ states, have influenced the course of the nuclear non-proliferation regime through their advocacy of a balanced approach to the implementation of the three pillars of the NPT. These states have exercised leadership by catalysing and consolidating progress at critical points in the development of the regime. Notable contributions by individual middle powers include General Assembly Resolution 1576 (XV) of 1960, proposed by Ireland and jointly submitted with Canada, Japan, Mexico and Morocco. This resolution preceded the negotiation of the NPT by calling upon “both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, pending agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, to refrain, as a temporary and voluntary measure, from acts that would lead to further proliferation.”¹¹¹ Additionally, Canada and South Africa played key roles in the extension and strengthening of the NPT at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and Australia was instrumental in securing the successful negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. It is through these contributions that middle power states have developed a reputation as advocates of nuclear disarmament; however, it is in coalition with other like-minded states that the diplomacy of these middle powers has proved to be most conducive to nuclear disarmament norm promotion.

Nuclear disarmament coalitions have enabled middle power states to develop policy, drive debate and engage other states that would otherwise be reluctant to consider potentially intrusive constraints on their sovereignty. This chapter considers the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) as a prime example of this middle power state-led coalition diplomacy. This coalition approach proved to be valuable asset between 1998 and 2000 in the movement to secure a consensus outcome at the 2000 RevCon; however, this outcome failed to gain traction beyond the conference itself. This chapter will investigate the advocacy strategy adopted by the NAC

¹¹⁰ D. MacFhionnbhairr, P. Lewis, M. Laker and L. F. Machado, “Constructing a New Agenda,” in J. Cirincione (ed.), *Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Routledge: New York, (2000), p. 267.

¹¹¹ United Nations General Assembly, 15th Session, *Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons*, UNGA Resolution 1576 (XV), (December 20, 1960), retrieved November 20, 2009 from <<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/15/ares15.htm>>.

with reference to the moderator variables outlined in the previous chapter. The following analysis will identify the conditions that influenced success of the NAC, as well as potential areas where the NAC states could improve their disarmament advocacy.

The New Agenda Coalition

From the outset, the NAC distinguished itself from the dominant bloc rivalry between the NWS and the NAM by establishing a position on nuclear disarmament that sought to balance NPT non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. Within the static regime environment dominated by voting blocs, the NAC championed an alternative and ultimately more inclusive policy position “to shake off the rigidity of the old agenda.”¹¹² The NAC member states Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden outlined the coalition’s objectives in a Joint Ministerial Declaration issued on June 9, 1998 in Dublin, Ireland.¹¹³ The NAC position on disarmament was notable for three reasons: (1) the balanced approach to nuclear disarmament, (2) the emphasis on the importance of NNWS efforts in cooperation with NWS, and (3) the importance of pursuing multiple, parallel efforts to advance the disarmament agenda across the board. This statement proposed a multi-stranded approach of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral actions, including reducing the high levels of NWS operational readiness, the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by Annex II states, the negotiation of the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in the CD and the development of requisite verification regimes by the international community. This statement outlined a more comprehensive direction for nuclear disarmament than has previously been articulated by a group of states at this level and formed the foundation for future NAC advocacy efforts in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the NPT RevCon and numerous other forums.

New Agenda Coalition advocacy in the lead up to the 2000 Review Conference

The NAC took advantage of the opportunities provided by multilateral forums such as the UNGA, generating momentum by engaging the international community in high profile debate. The NAC framed this debate by sponsoring UNGA and First Committee resolutions including the UN Resolution 53/77Y of December 4, 1998 which was adopted by 114 states,

¹¹² D. MacFhionnbhairr, P. Lewis, M. Laker and L. F. Machado, “Constructing a New Agenda,” p. 271.

¹¹³ *A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda*, Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, (June 9, 1998) retrieved August 30, 2008 from <<http://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/164/44/pdf/N9816444.pdf>>.

with 18 opposed and 38 abstentions. The second NAC resolution, *Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda* submitted in 1999 was adopted by a similar number of states with 111 votes in support, 13 opposed and 39 abstentions.¹¹⁴ These early NAC efforts were effective in raising the profile of the NAC proposals and captured the attention of the international community. These resolutions also provided a mechanism by which the NAC could publically aggregate international support. Voting patterns reveal that a number of NATO states abstained from voting (rather than opposing) the resolutions. This was notable as it suggested that there was more movement in the policy positions of the NATO states than previously expected from this voting bloc. It is difficult to determine the extent of influence of the NAC advocacy efforts; however, this high profile debate put the NWS into a position where they had to defend the adequacy of the disarmament measures undertaken to date and the seriousness of their commitment to the NPT obligations.¹¹⁵ It soon became clear that the NWS were also “far more concerned about the NAC resolution than about the more hard-line recurring resolutions from Myanmar and Malaysia, which called for ‘timebound nuclear disarmament and negotiations leading to a nuclear weapon convention.’”¹¹⁶ The NAC supported the UNGA resolutions by presenting a statement to the 1999 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) on 12 May and a working paper cosponsored by 44 states, making use of this multilateral forum to reinforce the UNGA resolutions and the NAC position.¹¹⁷

The NAC used the resolutions as an attempt to review implementation, (unfortunately this review element did not feature as prominently in later NAC efforts). The NAC went some way to developing a comprehensive policy solution, touching upon the implementation aspect of a forward looking disarmament strategy in UN Resolution 53/77Y of December 4, 1998. This resolution articulated a request to report on the implementation of the resolution (to be compiled by the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG)), the NAC intention to table a follow-up resolution, and review implementation at the fifty-fourth session of the UNGA in

¹¹⁴ Sponsored and co-sponsored by the governments of Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Ireland, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Samoa, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zambia. For the full text see R. Johnson, “UNGA First Committee Report,” *Disarmament Diplomacy*, 41, (November 1999), retrieved December 9, 2008 from <<http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd41/index.htm>>.

¹¹⁵ D. MacFhionnbhairr, P. Lewis, M. Laker and L. F. Machado, “Constructing a New Agenda,” p. 267.

¹¹⁶ The Acronym Institute, “First Committee Report,” *Disarmament Diplomacy*, 32, (November 1998), retrieved September 6, 2007 from <<http://www.acronym.org.uk/32first.htm>>.

¹¹⁷ R. Johnson, “Divisions and Doubts At the Third NPT PrepCom,” *Arms Control Today* (April/May 1999), retrieved December 16, 2008 from <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_04-05/rjam99>

1999. While the steps in the 2000 RevCon action plan referred to a number of concrete and actionable points as well as the more general commitments,¹¹⁸ the *13 Step* action plan was not articulated within a framework or structure that could provide ongoing support, and so the steps became outdated very quickly.

New Agenda Coalition advocacy at the 2000 Review Conference

Having established the ‘new agenda’ as key feature of the political landscape, the NAC states used the coalition as a platform to exercise leadership at the 2000 RevCon, concluding a constructive backwards looking document and a forward-looking action plan in negotiations moderated by Norway.¹¹⁹ Proposals were exchanged between the NAC and the NWS until a consensus was met on both documents. The success of the conference has been widely attributed to the NAC states’ skilled conference diplomacy, as these states acted as a bridge between the NWS and NAM. The NAC countries were able to exert influence on these voting blocs as they had access to all of the main UN caucus groups (such as the NAM, NWFZ areas, NATO and the European Union (EU)) by virtue of the diverse membership of the coalition. This direct engagement enabled the NAC states to advocate for the ‘new agenda’ directly to the broadest possible audience, unite the middle ground, and reach agreement on the language they had negotiated.¹²⁰ The consensus outcome was also concluded because of the momentum maintained by the NAC countries in the lead up to the RevCon which overcame the roadblocks, particularly over the language of Iraq’s non-compliance. Additionally, the NAC “were unprepared to see negative signals emerge” and “sought to concentrate on the areas where agreement was possible.”¹²¹

The success of this coalition as a negotiating nexus can be attributed to the NAC member states’ history of nuclear disarmament advocacy. The international standing of these states, reinforced by the coalition, contributed to the initial appeal the NAC position. In the lead-up to the formation of the NAC, these states made notable contributions to the nuclear disarmament movement within the non-proliferation regime including submissions to the ICJ *Advisory Opinion* hearings.¹²² Prior to this, Brazil had established a reputation for having

¹¹⁸ R. Johnson, “Divisions and Doubts At the Third NPT PrepCom.”

¹¹⁹ J. Simpson, “The 2000 NPT Review Conference,” *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook 2001*, Stockholm, (2001), p. 485.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² International Court of Justice (Advisory Opinion), *Legality of the Threat or Use of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons*, (July 8, 1996), retrieved December 1, 2010 from <<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf>>.

rolled back a nuclear program, signing the Brazilian-Argentine Agreement on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy in 1980, ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1994. As a key Arab and NAM state, Egypt was notable as a supporter of the weapons of mass destruction free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. Ireland as previously mentioned, was involved in the early development of the NPT and has remained a vocal advocate for disarmament as both a NATO and EU member. Mexico, representing Central America, is a supporter of the Southern Hemisphere Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (along with New Zealand).¹²³ New Zealand has established a reputation as a leading South Pacific nation, becoming nuclear free in 1987.¹²⁴ New Zealand also took the *French Nuclear Tests* case to the ICJ with Australia in 1995.¹²⁵ Slovenia withdrew from the coalition in 1999 due to NATO commitments.¹²⁶ South Africa disarmed its nuclear program between 1989 and 1993, (Sweden has also renounced a nuclear program in 1968). Consequently, Sweden has supported debate on the nuclear issue including sponsoring the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security.¹²⁷ The breadth of geographical and political representation provided the NAC with early legitimacy, which was an advantage as the NAC was able to generate significant interest and momentum around the policy position within a relatively brief timeframe.¹²⁸

The influence of a supportive international environment

The influence of the NAC was ultimately dependent upon a supportive international environment. As such, the contribution of the NAC must be understood within the period of

See J. Burroughs, *The (il)legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: A Guide to the Historic Opinion of the International Court of Justice*, Lit Verlag: Berlin (1998).

¹²³ K. Dewes, R. Powles, and A. Ware, "Snaring the Sun: Opportunities to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and advance nuclear disarmament through an abolition framework," *The Disarmament and Security Centre*, retrieved November 3, 2009 from http://www.disarmsecure.org/publications/papers/Snaring_the_Sun.php.

¹²⁴ The New Zealand government passed the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act in 1987. The Act prohibits "entry into the internal waters of New Zealand 12 miles (22.2 km) radius by any ship whose propulsion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power" and bans the dumping of radioactive waste within the nuclear-free zone, as well as prohibiting New Zealand citizens or residents from seeking "to manufacture, acquire, possess, or have any control over any nuclear explosive device."

¹²⁵ International Court of Justice, *Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of December 20, 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France)*, Order of September 22, 1995, General List No. 97 (1995). This case referred to the earlier Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) Judgment, General List No. 58 (December 20, 1974) and Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, General List No. 59 (December 20, 1974). These cases can be retrieved from <http://www.icj-cij.org>.

¹²⁶ R. Green, "Fast track to zero nuclear weapons: the Middle Powers Initiative a briefing book," p. 10.

¹²⁷ G. Chafetz, H. Abramson, S. Grillot, "Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," *Political Psychology*, 17, 4, (December 1996), p. 727.

¹²⁸ D. MacFhionnbhairr, P. Lewis, M. Laker and L. F. Machado, "Constructing a New Agenda," p. 270.

disarmament and threat reduction activity that followed the end of the Cold War.¹²⁹ Movement on nuclear disarmament was made possible by the decrease in great power confrontation, which spurred the introduction of new treaties limiting the deployment of nuclear arms (including the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 1991 and the CTBT which opened for signature in 1996), nuclear roll-back in South Africa and disarmament in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.¹³⁰ The decade that followed the end of the Cold War is also notable for negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which was signed in 1993 and entered into force in 1997. As such this decade is often referred to as a 'disarmament decade'; however, this disarmament momentum was one of two trends that developed. The second, rising proliferation concerns (in particular with Iraq and North Korea) prompted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to reform its safeguards system, adopting the Model Additional Protocol on May 15, 1997.¹³¹ This provided positive precedent for additional reform within the non-proliferation regime. In addition, the weapons tests by two non-NPT states, India, Pakistan, served as an impetus to shore up this regime and conclude a constructive RevCon outcome.¹³² This coalition was able to take advantage of the heightened tensions created by proliferation concerns and the increased expectations for further progress on disarmament, transforming this political will into a the concrete, albeit limited, forward-looking consensus agreement.

The demise of the bi-polar system created space for actors such as the NAC to more actively pursue nuclear-based foreign policies and claim a greater voice within the regime. The NAC states were successful in taking advantage of this opportunity as they crafted policies that had a broad appeal to the international community. This appeal can be attributed to the NAC states capacity to accurately frame the policy problem and solutions consistent with existing norms and present the solutions as a logical outcome of current developments. The NAC actively sought to frame their disarmament policy within complementary logics of

¹²⁹ Part 1, "Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policy Makers," *Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament*, retrieved October 16, 2010 from <<http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/part-i.html>>.

¹³⁰ See T. Ogilvie-White, "Negotiating Nuclear Rollback in North Korea: Lessons from Ukraine and Libya", (forthcoming). See also Nuclear Threat Initiative, *South Africa: Nuclear Overview*, (January 2010) retrieved January 23, 2010 from <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SAfrica/Nuclear/index.html> and L. S Wittner, *Towards Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement*, Stanford University Press; 1st edition (August 2003), p. 443.

¹³¹ J. Simpson, "Nuclear Arms Control: Appendix 6B. The 2000 NPT Review Conference," *Non- Proliferation, Arms Control, Disarmament*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (2000), p. 488.

¹³² Pakistan and India tested nuclear weapons in 1998. Such tests are widely considered evidence that a state has crossed the 'nuclear threshold' to become a 'nuclear armed state' (notwithstanding the fact that India had formally tested a nuclear explosive device in 1973).

appropriateness, creating parallels between this position and that of chemical and biological weapons, referring to the Conventions of 1972 and 1993. The NAC states also emphasised supporting arguments drawn from the Canberra Commission and the International Court of Justice *Advisory Opinion*.¹³³ These states clearly identified the problem caused by Pakistan and India and used this as a reason for the “renewed urgency in the debate.”¹³⁴ The NAC was also pragmatic in acknowledging the long term challenge of building a verification regime as such, the balanced package of policies offered had a broad appeal to the NWS and the increasingly vocal NAM.

The 2005 Review Conference and the influence of a hostile international environment

The conclusion of a consensus outcome document at the 2000 RevCon is a remarkable achievement given the conflicting nuclear norms, “generally unfavourable disarmament and international security context”¹³⁵ and the volatile nature of the non-proliferation regime politics. Given that this consensus collapsed shortly after the conference ended, the significance of long term middle power influence on this debate is bought into doubt. The divisive reinterpretation of the 2000 RevCon outcome resulted in little, if any, progress on the *13 Steps* between 2000 and the 2005 Rev Con. The NWS rolled-back or avoided their political commitments, while political will to implement this agreement was absent across the board. This marked “the onset of the ‘great frustration’ in arms control efforts.”¹³⁶ The international community responded to security challenges (such as North Korean non-compliance and withdrawal from the treaty, the discovery of the A. Q. Khan Black market network¹³⁷ and the abuse of proliferation controls and verification mechanisms by Iran) by focusing on non-proliferation and counter proliferation to the detriment of progress on disarmament.¹³⁸

¹³³ International Court of Justice (Advisory Opinion), *Legality of the Threat or Use of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons*.

¹³⁴ *A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda*, Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden.

¹³⁵ J. Simpson, “The 2000 NPT Review Conference”, SIPRI Yearbook 2001, Stockholm 2001, p. 487.

Consensus on a Final Declaration has only been achieved at three previous conferences (in 1975, 1985 and 2000).

¹³⁶ M. Hanson and C. Ungerer, “The Canberra Commission: Paths Followed, Paths Ahead,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 53, 1, (April 1999), p. 2.

¹³⁷ K. Dewes, R. Powles, and A. Ware, “Snaring the Sun: Opportunities to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and advance nuclear disarmament through an abolition framework.”

¹³⁸ H. Muller, “The 2005 NPT Review Conference: Reasons and Consequences of Failure and Options for Repair,” p. 12.

The international response was led by the neo-conservative Bush Administration which favoured plurilateral initiatives over multilateralism and international law. Actions such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the multinational force (MNF-I) that invaded Iraq to address concerns regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) directly challenged the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) mandate, in turn undermining the international community's confidence in multilateralism and the NPT. The United States nuclear weapons policy outlined in the 2002 United States National Security Strategy reaffirmed United States reliance on nuclear deterrence and offense nuclear capabilities.¹³⁹ This neo-conservative policy direction ran counter the *13 Step* objectives and was heavily criticised by the NAM, further deepening the divide between NWS and the NNWS.¹⁴⁰ While the 2005 RevCon failure cannot be solely attributed to the inaction of the NAC given the overwhelming pressure from forces outside the RevCon environment, in a striking comparison to the 2000 Review, NAC leadership was absent. It appears that the 'NAC-NWS negotiating nexus' was unique to 2000. The NAC was not able to demonstrate consistent support for the outcome between 2000 and 2005 or advance the 'new agenda' further.

Internal divisions and the collapse of the New Agenda Coalition

In the face of internal divisions the NAC began to fall apart "soon after it brought about the ground breaking disarmament plan of action."¹⁴¹ The NAC had been under pressure from the very beginning as demonstrated by Slovenia's withdrawal from the coalition.¹⁴² The breakdown of the NAC became apparent at the NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings in the three years prior to 2005. Despite annual NAC resolutions to the UN First Committee on Disarmament and International Security and position papers at the PrepCom meetings the NAC could do little to raise the profile of the 13 Steps or follow up on their implementation.¹⁴³ By 2005 the NAC common statements could not hide that fact that "Egypt and Sweden were barely speaking" and that the NAC members were pursuing individual

¹³⁹ H. Muller, "The 2005 NPT Review Conference: Reasons and Consequences of Failure and Options for Repair," p. 6.

¹⁴⁰ J. Cirincione, "Failure in New York," The suggestion was that the US non-proliferation and counter-proliferation stance insisting that a focus solely on the prevention of the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons sidelined disarmament issues.

¹⁴¹ R. Johnson, "Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed."

¹⁴² R. Green, "Fast track to zero nuclear weapons: the Middle Powers Initiative a briefing book".

¹⁴³ Ibid.

interests and agendas.¹⁴⁴ Two individual NAC member states did play a prominent role in the 2005 RevCon but on their own, did not contribute in an effective manner. Egypt played a large role in negotiating the wording of the proposed agenda and was not “particularly cooperative”;¹⁴⁵ however, Rebecca Johnson suggests that Egypt appeared to have a “constructive regime building motivation” in contrast to the United States and Iran’s narrow self-interest.¹⁴⁶ The nomination of Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte (Brazil) as the RevCon President was largely due to Brazil’s role in 2000 as NAC member and its association with the NAM. Whilst it was suggested by New Zealand that Duarte was “dignified, consultative and patient,”¹⁴⁷ the results of the meeting suggest that he was ineffective, constrained by the hostile context and the irreconcilable positions held by a few states that made the role of the President close to impossible. International circumstances in this context were extremely unfavourable and offered few opportunities for middle powers such as the NAC to mediate or bridge these concerns; however the opportunities that were available were not exploited effectively.

The contribution of the New Agenda Coalition to the nuclear disarmament norm

John Simpson suggests that given the “new environment of fragmentation of large groupings and of cross-cutting interests groups only active, multilinked states will be able to achieve their aims and objectives.”¹⁴⁸ Simpson suggests that the main contribution of the NAC to the outcome of the 2000 conference was the structural and organisational approach taken, which represents an evolution of conference diplomacy. While the NAC was undoubtedly successful as a platform for middle power disarmament advocacy between 1998 and 2000, the broader significance of this coalition as a platform for the long-term development of the nuclear disarmament norm is subject to certain conditions.

The NAC touched upon a number of potentially successful strategies, but may not have exercised these strategies to their full potential. This raises a number of questions concerning what more these states could have done to advance the norm of nuclear disarmament. In particular, the capacity of middle powers to exercise leadership in a hostile international security context is the Achilles heel of this thesis. While it was extremely difficult for the

¹⁴⁴ J. Simpson, “Nuclear Arms Control: Appendix 6B. The 2000 NPT Review Conference,” p. 487.

¹⁴⁵ J. Simpson and J. Nielsen, “The 2005 Review Conference: Mission Impossible?” *The Nonproliferation Review*, 12, 2, (July 2005), p. 275.

¹⁴⁶ R. Johnson, “Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed.”

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ J. Simpson, “Nuclear Arms Control: Appendix 6B. The 2000 NPT Review Conference,” p. 488.

middle power states to exert an influence in 2005, despite the pressures, there were opportunities available to the middle power states of the NAC that were not used to the coalition's advantage. Could the NAC have mitigated the constraining influences more successfully? What expectations can legitimately be placed on middle power states?

The NAC made a contributed to nuclear disarmament by developing a package of policies that attempted to address the causes of the problem, and presented clear and tangible policy solutions. At the outset this position appeared to be reasonable and was accepted by all states parties in 2000; however, the immediate collapse of this consensus suggests that this effort was wholly insufficient to bring about long-lasting change in NWS decision-making. The dynamics of international politics constrained what influence the NAC did exert in 2000. The consensus outcome at the 2000 RevCon was a necessary first step to shore up state support for this non-proliferation regime. It is however, only the first step of many and as such many of the *13 Steps* are yet to be implemented.¹⁴⁹ The development of such a comprehensive implementation strategy is not within the ambit of the RevCon Process or a middle power coalition like the NAC. Beyond the submission of working papers to the PrepCom in 2008 and 2008, questions remain as to whether the NAC could have played a greater role in the implementation of the 13 Step objectives.

The brief time period (1998-2000) of NAC influence is insufficient to guarantee a long term contribution to the process of disarmament. While the coalition remains intact, subsequent working papers have done little to maintain momentum. Moreover, the NAC outlined broad objectives which left the coalition vulnerable to internal dispute over the direction of specific objectives. The NAC could have improved its advocacy by undertaking the following actions: (1) maintaining momentum on the issues or policies, (2) implementing progress (based on commitments and agreement undertaken), (3) maintaining internal cohesion within the coalition, (4) guaranteeing the longevity of the coalition to ensure a consistent presence, (5) framing both the issues and the solutions more accurately and effectively (with due regard to the operating environment, (6) defining specific objectives, policies or deliverables at the

¹⁴⁹ The implementation of Article VI requires a profound change in the organisation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and as a starting point, there must be greater uniformity of legal and political obligations. It involves reducing both the level of armaments and reliance on these weapons in security policies; yet, as states such as the NWS argue, it is just as necessary to implement the conditions that would enable such reductions to have a positive impact on international security.

outset and (7) the creation of an environment that will support disarmament.¹⁵⁰ As the following chapters will investigate, there appears to be a certain amount of scope for the coalition to manoeuvre.

¹⁵⁰ Director General S. Kongstad, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Seminar: A Nordic Initiative for Nuclear Abolition*, Oslo 15 April 2009, National Consultative Committee on Disarmament Annual Conference 2009 (papers) p. 4.

Chapter Four: Alternative approaches to middle power advocacy in nuclear non-proliferation regime

This chapter focuses on the alternative coalition strategies that have been demonstrated by middle powers within the nuclear non-proliferation regime environment. This chapter considers the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Group of Five (NATO-5) as an alternative example of a middle power coalition and then turns to the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), the Seven Nation Initiative (7NI) and the independent nuclear commissions (from the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security (Palme Commission) through to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND)). Middle power states have invested in transnational advocacy networks and independent international commissions to complement state-led action. Consequently, there is a broader range of diplomatic strategies available to middle power states which employ a cooperative approach than the NAC or NATO-5 would suggest. In addition, this chapter demonstrates that these middle power states have a capacity to tailor their diplomacy to suit specific circumstances or to pursue specific objectives. This analysis will be framed by the moderator variables and will consider in particular the capacity of the middle power entrepreneur, where these states have successfully framed the norm, identified the problem, clarified the policy solutions and mitigated international constraints.

While it is important to recognise the limitations inherent to middle power diplomacy, these alternative approaches provide options to remedy the shortcomings in the NAC approach identified in the previous chapter.¹⁵¹

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Group of Five (NATO-5)

The NATO-5 is an informal grouping of five European middle power states including Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway. It originated in 1999 with a Belgian proposal for “a CD working group for talks on nuclear disarmament (as opposed to an ad hoc committee).”¹⁵² This nuclear security coalition has provided a platform for the member states to advocate for a number of specific issues including the NATO nuclear sharing arrangement, the removal of tactical weapons from the NATO territories, the early entry into force of the CTBT and increased transparency regarding the number of warheads, delivery systems and

¹⁵¹ See for example p. 36 of this thesis.

¹⁵² R. Johnson, *Midnight Oil on Troubled Waters*, Sixth NPT Review Conference, Briefing No 14, (May 16, 2000), retrieved February 28, 2010 from <URL: <http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/npt14.htm>>.

stocks of fissile materials.¹⁵³ This group was active at the 2000 RevCon, but was not as engaged as the NAC in active conference diplomacy. Instead, the NATO-5 supported the NAC-sponsored 'middle ground.' The NATO-5 was noted to have voiced criticism over a revised draft of the 2000 RevCon Main Committee I text suggesting that the language was too weak. The NATO-5 was in favour of increased transparency "with regard to [NWS] nuclear capabilities and agreements as a voluntary confidence building measure" and they considered that the "paragraph on non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons had been watered down too far."¹⁵⁴

The NATO-5 coalition has been employed by the member states to accomplish very different and much more limited objectives. The NATO-5 is an example of a breakout group, advocating for policy change from within a major UN voting bloc. While the coalition has issued broad statements on middle ground issues, it has advocated for relatively specific, NATO related concerns. As a smaller, more homogenous group (all European NATO middle powers) this group is more likely to share similar values; however, where some parties have held stronger views on certain issues, they have broken out into a smaller group still, the NATO-3 (Belgium, Norway and the Netherlands), which has taken a more proactive stand.¹⁵⁵ This issue specificity has been effective, avoiding the sort of internal disputes that divided and incapacitated the NAC. The narrow focus and limited geographic spread of coalition membership is appropriate for issues relating to the NATO bloc; but is unlikely to achieve broad appeal (outside NATO). The membership of the coalition, issue specificity and internal cohesion (within the coalition) are critical factors as these informal efforts are "fragile at the detail level."¹⁵⁶

This coalition has liaised with other NATO states such as Canada, Denmark, Japan, Finland, Spain and Sweden on an ad hoc basis.¹⁵⁷ These flexible relationships allow the core states to expand membership where appropriate, and retain cohesion of the core group. Again, this dynamic should mean that internal tensions are less likely to get in the way of concerted advocacy. This loosely affiliated coalition is less ambitious and structured than the NAC, which makes it easier for the core group of states to cooperate with other middle powers that share similar NATO-related concerns. The flipside however, is that the ad hoc /informal

¹⁵³ M. Kurosawa, "Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament," Osaka University, Japan, retrieved February 27, 2010 from <<http://www.nautilus.org/archives/nukepolicy/workshops/shanghai-01/kurosawapaper.txt>>.

¹⁵⁴ R. Johnson, *Midnight Oil on Troubled Waters*.

¹⁵⁵ K. Colijn, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Medium-Power Concern?" p. 366.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

nature of this group means that states are less likely to invest or remain committed to the advocacy to its natural conclusion. In this example, rather than the policy disputes that challenged the NAC, the flexible nature of this coalition structure has resulted in stresses within the group over emphasis and tactics.¹⁵⁸

Consequently, the NATO-5 was most active around the time of its inception and acted largely below the radar (or not at all in the last decade). This group has been opportunistic, acting on issues only where there has been scope to voice their opinion. In comparison to the NAC (which established a very high profile and ambitious advocacy campaign), there is no expectation on the NATO-5 states to maintain a consistent presence. This has meant that the NATO-5 has not achieved any notable influence to date; however, as a strategy the NATO-5 states have greater flexibility to wield the coalition as a tool when appropriate. This is a pragmatic and realistic tactic given the fact that their policies were largely overlooked by the three NATO NWS in the last decade. In the lead up to the 2010 RevCon, the NATO-5 re-emerged to request the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from their territories.¹⁵⁹ This is an important step in the disarmament debate and a very visible symbol of shifting attitudes within NATO. The NATO-5 statement was well timed (ahead of the May RevCon) and launched the tactical weapons debate onto the international agenda at a time when both the NPT and NATO force postures are under review.¹⁶⁰

Transnational Advocacy Networks

As previously touched upon in Chapter Two, the middle power state-NGO relationship can form an important facet of middle power state advocacy. This relationship can provide middle power coalitions with a competitive advantage as the knowledge, skills, resources and networks brought to the table by civil society, NGOs and epistemic communities are assets where public sector resources are limited. International relations now resembles a “three level game” in recognition of the role of international, domestic, and transnational (non-governmental) actors.¹⁶¹ Transnational actors operate outside or on the periphery of the non-proliferation regime and expand the scope of the middle power advocacy platform by

¹⁵⁸ K. Colijn, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Medium-Power Concern?” p. 366.

¹⁵⁹ “Five NATO States Want U.S. Nukes Out of Europe, Report Says,” *Global Security Newswire*, (February 19, 2010), retrieved February 20, 2010 from <http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100219_2293.php>.

¹⁶⁰ “Five NATO States Want U.S. Nukes Out of Europe, Report Says,” *Global Security Newswire*, (February 19, 2010), retrieved February 20, 2010 from <http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100219_2293.php>.

¹⁶¹ M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, p. 35.

providing alternative channels through which to communicate with the international community.¹⁶² Participation in these networks, in partnership or as joint ventures, enables middle power states to communicate directly with civil society and government officials in receiving countries.¹⁶³ The middle power state tendency to foster close relationships with civil society fuses traditional diplomatic methods and public diplomacy and has been reflected in the middle power coalitions.¹⁶⁴ State-NGO partnerships have proven to be the key to the viability and longevity of these coalitions. Additionally, these transnational networks, which are increasingly visible as actors in the non-proliferation regime, demonstrate a variety of strategies that compliment middle power diplomacy and could be adopted by the state-led coalitions.

The Middle Powers Initiative

The MPI is a transnational advocacy network comprised of eight international NGOs.¹⁶⁵ The MPI was established in 1998 to create a middle power coalition (based on similar efforts in the Ottawa Process and World Court Project) to advance the disarmament objective of the MPI NGOs.¹⁶⁶ Middle power states make attractive partners for transnational networks, as these states provide a vehicle for NGOs to access and influence state-level debate. The independent launch of the NAC in 1998 coincided with this initiative and assumed the role envisaged by the MPI coalition a year earlier than expected.¹⁶⁷ The MPI developed a close relationship with the NAC countries and played an important role in mobilising civil society and governments in support of the NAC in 1999/2000,¹⁶⁸ acting as a bridge between global

¹⁶² M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink, "Activists beyond borders," p. 1.

¹⁶³ Daryl Copeland, "Virtuality, Diplomacy, and the Foreign Ministry: Does Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada Need a 'V Tower'?" *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 15, 2, (Summer 2009), p.3.

¹⁶⁴ M. A Rudderham, "Middle Power Pull: Can Middle Powers use Public Diplomacy to Ameliorate the Image of the West?" p. 18.

¹⁶⁵ These NGOs are: the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), International Peace Bureau (IPB), Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILF) State of the World Forum, Parliamentarians for Global Action, and the International Network of Engineers and Scientists.

¹⁶⁶ This network was brought together by Canadian Senator and former Disarmament Ambassador Douglas Roche, drawing "upon the experience of both the World Court Project and 'Ottawa Process' on banning anti-personnel landmines." R. Green, "A Fast Track to Zero Nuclear Weapons: The Middle Power Initiative and the New Agenda Coalition," *Medicine, Conflict and Survival*, 16, 1, (January-March 2000), p. 24. The NGOs include the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), International Peace Bureau (IPB), Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILF), the State of the World Forum, Parliamentarians for Global Action, and the International Network of Engineers and Scientists.

¹⁶⁷ R. Green, "A Fast Track to Zero Nuclear Weapons: The Middle Power Initiative and the New Agenda Coalition," p. 24.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

civil society (grassroots activism and elite/ state level action),¹⁶⁹ the NAC states and other states party to the NPT.

As a transnational network comprised of national and international NGOs, the MPI is different in structure and capacity to a middle power state-led coalition; however, MPI activities complemented the diplomacy of the NAC states. These complementary actions can inform future middle power advocacy in two ways. Firstly, middle power coalition partnerships with transnational networks are a very useful method to support middle power foreign ministries. It is difficult to determine the exact influence of the MPI on NAC policy; however, this state-NGO relationship was an important (functional) part of the NAC success. The MPI proved to be a valuable asset for the NAC by expanding the resources available to the NAC in the lead up to the 2000 RevCon.¹⁷⁰ The MPI promoted the NAC objectives throughout the international community and in particular, the MPI focused on the NATO states, as NATO's influential opposition to the NAC objectives was apparent in UN voting on the NAC resolutions in 1998 and 1999 (and also in Slovenia's withdrawal from the NAC). MPI delegations visited Canada, Germany, the Netherlands (as well as NATO allies Japan and Australia) to establish support for the NAC position.¹⁷¹ The MPI diversified the channels of communication channels available to the NAC diplomats by including former senior political leaders and parliamentarians to reach a very different audience from a purely state-based (track I) negotiations.¹⁷²

Middle power states could utilise the diplomatic strategies adopted by the MPI to achieve longevity, maintain momentum and to formulate policy. The MPI remained intact (despite the changing international circumstances) because it developed a formalised organisational structure with permanent staff and offices. The development of a formal structure by a middle power coalition would require an initial investment (which may not be practical or achievable), but the formality would ensure the commitment of parties over a longer term. The MPI mitigated the waning influence of the NAC (the MPI's main vehicle for influence)

¹⁶⁹ R. Tyson, "Elite Activism," *International Peace Update*, 68, 2+3: Focussing on Freedom, (July 2003), p. 22, retrieved November 3, 2009 from <http://www.wilpfinternational.org/PDF/publications/IPUs%20PDF/IPU_Vol68_2+3_2003.pdf>.

¹⁷⁰ The NAC was established independently but very close in timing to the MPI, informal links were made with the NAC in July 1998 R. Green, "A Fast Track to Zero Nuclear Weapons: The Middle Power Initiative and the New Agenda Coalition," p. 24.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Notable individuals include Ambassador Henrik Salander of Sweden, Rt. Hon. Kim Campbell former Prime Minister of Canada, Canadian Senator and former Disarmament Ambassador Douglas Roche, and former MP Marian Hobbs of New Zealand.

by developing flexible, more consultative relationships with a large pool of (up to 25) middle power states.¹⁷³ This flexible and consultative character was useful to increase the membership of the middle power grouping but it diluted the influence of the MPI, as policy formation is much harder with a larger group. The loosely affiliated states did not form an active state coalition, making it difficult to promote new policy beyond this self selected group.

The most visible and perhaps important function of the MPI was the creation of ‘informal spaces to debate policy,’ or track II forums where diplomats and civil society can develop new policy ideas outside the official setting with relative freedom.¹⁷⁴ These ideas can then be taken back to capitals and disseminated. The MPI for example, established the Article VI forum to “stimulate and shape effective responses to the crisis of the non-proliferation / disarmament regime manifested by the breakdown of the 2005 NPT Review Conference.”¹⁷⁵ The advantage provided by the coalition dynamic stems from the coalition capacity to develop quality policies. Improving this capacity through formal and informal consultation could complement coalition efforts to formulate viable policies.

The Seven Nation Initiative

The Seven Nation Initiative (7NI) was launched in 2007 by Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa and the United Kingdom. This is an example of a collective effort by a group of middle power states to accurately identify and respond the challenges facing the non-proliferation regime.¹⁷⁶ This platform is notable for three reasons: (1) it involves a NWS, the United Kingdom. (2) These states have established a relationship with a broad network of NGOs, civil society and academic institutions. (3) It was as a clearinghouse mechanism to facilitate the exchange of information and identify further areas for

¹⁷³ There is a self-selecting group of middle power states which attend events at the invitation of the MPI including Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile Costa Rica, Egypt, Germany, Italy Iceland, Indonesia Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, and Ukraine.

¹⁷⁴ Middle Powers Initiative, “A Global Undertaking: Realizing the Disarmament Promise of the NPT”, Briefing paper *Atlanta Consultation III: Fulfilling the NPT*, (January 21-22, 2009), retrieved July 20, 2009 from <www.middlepowers.org/AtlantaIII/summary.htm>.

¹⁷⁵ Public Diplomacy Magazine, “Public Diplomacy in Practice,” retrieved December 12, 2009 from <<http://publicdiplomacymagazine.com/public-diplomacy-in-practice/leveraging-soft-power-currency-against-hard-power-weapons>>.

¹⁷⁶ The agenda of the 7NI was endorsed by nearly 100 states at the 2005 UN World Summit in New York. See Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa and the United Kingdom on strengthening adherence to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agreements, (July 26, 2005), retrieved May 26, 2007 from <<http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0507/doc05.htm>>.

cooperation. This initiative is something of a hybrid as it is part middle power state coalition-part transnational coalition.

The inclusion of the United Kingdom dramatically changes the dynamic of the middle power grouping as a micro-climate for the development of new policy. While the 7NI middle power states represent a diverse geographical and political spread, (including members from all the influential voting blocs- the EU, the NAM, NATO and the Western Group and Others) the inclusion of the United Kingdom increases the likelihood that this group will be able to develop persuasive and feasible policies. In addition, the inclusion of the UK could strengthen the NWS-NNWS relationship, which was critical to the 2000 outcome. It also opens the way for increased cooperation between NWS and NNWS. Such cooperation can already be seen in the form of the Norway-United Kingdom-VERTIC initiative. This initiative addresses the technical issues involved in creating a verifiable disarmament solution (acceptable to NWS and NNWS alike).¹⁷⁷ Rather than overt policy advocacy, this group has invested in the technical measures to advance disarmament. This initiative is similar to earlier efforts by NAC members Sweden, New Zealand and Mexico and (and Norway), who in the late 1980s and early 1990s “began developing technical capabilities and international communication sharing networks to monitor nuclear tests worldwide.”¹⁷⁸ This was an ad hoc group that demonstrated the verification capabilities required for the CTBT even though the NWS had not started negotiations. It was this demonstration of feasibility that overcame the blocks in negotiations.¹⁷⁹ It is difficult to assess whether these practical initiatives or ‘skilled conference diplomacy’ have a greater influence on the emerging norm, rather such efforts are complementary.

While the 7NI is a state-led coalition, the group’s relationship with NGOs, civil society and academic institutions has meant that this coalition also reflects the characteristics of a transnational advocacy network (at least in terms of information exchange between international actors). The 7NI states have sponsored and coordinated a number of projects from civil society partners. This group is not intended to replace existing arrangements rather, it aims to complement current activity as these states continue to participate in other groupings and coalitions. The 7NI objectives suggest that this platform could be developed as

¹⁷⁷ H. Elbahtimy, “VERTIC UK- Norway Initiative: mapping progress,” retrieved February 28, 2010 from <URL:<http://www.vertic.org/assets/Events/UK-Norway%20Initiative-FINAL.pdf>>.

¹⁷⁸ K. Dewes, R. Powles and A. Ware, “Snaring the Sun: Opportunities to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and advance nuclear disarmament through an abolition framework.”

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

a bridge between these groups in the NPT review process.¹⁸⁰ It is clear that this coalition has adopted a more subtle, technical and nuanced approach to policy development and advocacy than the very visible NAC; however, to date, the 7NI has not been utilised as a platform for disarmament advocacy in traditional negotiating forums. Instead, this group has been active behind the scenes to “extend consensus” on disarmament and non-proliferation concerns.

¹⁸¹ The 7NI is still in its infancy and the contribution of the coalition to the norm of disarmament is unknown; however, it has taken strategic decision to align the middle power coalition approach with a NWS and a transnational network. This certainly increases the likelihood that this coalition will achieve longevity, contribute to high-level policy development and implement practical solutions.

International Commissions and State Sponsored Reports

This section addresses middle power state-sponsored international commissions including: the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security (Palme Commission), sponsored by Sweden, which published the report *Our Common Security* report in 1982, the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Canberra Commission), sponsored by Australia, which published the *Canberra Report* in 1996, the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (Tokyo Forum), sponsored by Japan, which published the *Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century* report in 1999, the Weapons of Mass destruction Commission (Blix Commission) which published the *Weapons of Terror* report in 1996, also sponsored by Sweden, and the International Commission on Nuclear Non Proliferation and Disarmament (ICCND), sponsored by Australian and Japan, which published the report *Eliminating Nuclear Threats - A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers* in 2009.

These commissions offer alternative strategies that may also benefit middle power advocacy coalitions. As Marianne Hanson states, the emergence of these commissions has

“represented an important shift in agency and norm reinforcement in global politics, a new area of intersection between governmental and non-governmental processes, and reflected a novel move away from traditional great power negotiations on security

¹⁸⁰ J. G. Støre, in M. A Pomper, J. G. Støre, K Subrahmanyam, T.R Pickering, J. Dhanapala, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: The Next 40 Years,” *Arms Control Today*, 38, 5, (June 2008), p. 6.

¹⁸¹ The Seven Nation Initiative on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament *Clearinghouse*, retrieved February 28, 2010 from < <http://www.7ni.mfa.no/About/About.htm>>.

issues. At a concrete level, these reports were the tangible results of the keenness felt by these Advocacy States to promote disarmament norms.”¹⁸²

International commissions differ markedly from their coalition counterparts. Rather than involving direct *state-led* engagement in disarmament advocacy, the commissions provide middle powers with a *state-sponsored* platform to focus on conceptual and policy development. While it is not possible to compare the contribution made by commissions to middle power coalitions, the commissions are sponsored by middle powers and it makes sense to consider what elements of the commission approach, if any, could benefit future middle power coalitions.

The commission-style diplomacy offers a very different method by which to develop new policy solutions. These commissions specialise in high-level policy formation and take a more academic and investigative approach to the disarmament issue than could be expected of a state coalition as the independent commissioners are often experts in highly specialised fields. The policy development and (initial) advocacy is undertaken by a panel of independent international commissioners from a variety of states. As a ‘focus group’ commissions engage in “systematic enquiry designed to bring new general ideas and specific proposals to a problem of international or global significance.”¹⁸³ These commissions are a temporary feature of the international landscape; however, the reports and recommendations often remain part of the international dialogue for at least five years.¹⁸⁴ These commissions have proved particularly effective as platforms from which to capture global public interest for a specific period of time and have been useful to direct public attention to a problem.

Despite being discrete organisations, with no temporal overlap, these independent nuclear commissions have contributed to the collective development and evolution of nuclear disarmament as a norm. This independence is a useful vehicle for middle powers to propagate concepts that the states themselves may not be able to advocate directly. The commissions draw attention to the issues not the governments behind them. Notable contributions include the Palme Commission, the first public, high-level acknowledgment of the low military utility of nuclear weapons and the futility of nuclear warfare, sentiments that continue to underline

¹⁸² M. Hanson, “The Advocacy States: Their Normative Role Before and After the U.S. Call for Nuclear Zero,” p. 75.

¹⁸³ Edward Luck, “Blue Ribbon Power: Independent Commissions and the UN 2000,” *International Studies Perspectives*, 1, 1, (April 2000), p. 25.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

the current disarmament debate.¹⁸⁵ It was also the first example of a middle power state's attempt to lead on the 'high' political subject of nuclear security and disarmament. Additionally, the Canberra Commission refuted the strategic, technological and political arguments against nuclear elimination that emerged at the end of the Cold War, in a comprehensive and detailed manner.¹⁸⁶ The most recent international commission- the ICNND, sought bring a pragmatic face to disarmament, building on previous effort (Canberra and Tokyo) positioning its report to precede the 2010 Review Conference, to be the basis for successful negotiations on a consensus document in the lead up the May Conference.¹⁸⁷ This independence can be considered to be an asset as it provides the state-sponsored commission with a certain amount of freedom to develop forward-thinking ambitious policies.¹⁸⁸

Engaging complementary strategies

These commissions demonstrate that it is possible for middle power states to initiate the development of viable policies but these states many not need to be involved in the advocacy of the policies themselves. The fact that the commission outcomes are largely independent from the state-sponsor may have a positive repercussion. In spite of the Howard Government's decision not to support the Canberra Commission Report, Austria, Brazil and Sweden used this Report to call for greater consideration of nuclear weapons elimination in the context of the CD agenda and the NAC countries embraced these principles driving them forward into the 2000 Rev Con.¹⁸⁹ Individual commissioners including General Lee Butler and Robert McNamara also adopted the role that, under different circumstances, the Australian government might have been expected to play.¹⁹⁰ This example demonstrates the vulnerability of middle power advocacy to changing governments and domestic resource constraints. It also demonstrates that the commission reports can contribute to norm advocacy with minimum effort on the part of the sponsoring state. Middle power state-sponsored

¹⁸⁵ G. Wiseman, "The Palme Commission: New Thinking about Security," in Thakur R., Cooper A. F. and English J. (eds.), *International Commissions and the Power of Ideas*, United Nations University Press (June 2005), p. 63.

¹⁸⁶ "The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Report (Part One): The Nuclear Weapon Debate," Report of the *Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons*, (January 1997) retrieved September 10, 2007 from <<http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html>>.

¹⁸⁷ "Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the Twenty First Century," *The Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament*, Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (July 25, 1999), retrieved May 6, 2009 from <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/forum/tokyo9907/index.html>>.

¹⁸⁸ G. Wiseman, "The Palme Commission: New Thinking about Security," p. 60.

¹⁸⁹ M. Hanson and C. Ungerer "The Canberra Commission: Paths Followed, Paths Ahead," p. 8.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 8.

commissions could provide a valuable alternative where it is not possible to guarantee the longevity of a middle power coalition advocacy.

Middle powers could appropriate aspects of the commission approach to enhance the efficiency of the coalition effort. Given that these commissions began as state-sponsored initiatives, it is not inconceivable that this style of policy formation could translate into the coalition context. Middle power coalitions could mimic this commission activity by designating experts from each state to form a commission on a policy area of concern or the coalition could invest in a partnership with a commission (much like the transnational advocacy network partnerships as previously discussed).¹⁹¹ A partnership between an international commission and middle power coalition could benefit both parties. Japan and Australia have taken an individualistic approach to the ICNND report of 2009.¹⁹² Japan has proposed a separate 11 point plan for the 2010 RevCon, whereas Australia has largely been quiet on the issue. Had the ICNND report been received by a middle power coalition, the dynamic created may have been quite effective.¹⁹³

In addition, diplomatic strategies that take into account the inherent limitations of the middle power states and the coalition approach are more likely to succeed. Middle power norm entrepreneurs need to take into account the internal disputes, external pressures and limited resources that may cause these states to withdraw from the coalition or fail to maintain momentum on the policy positions they once sought to advocate. Moreover, the lengthy process of disarmament advocacy is vulnerable to the waning political will and state disinterest, requiring the repeated investment of large amounts of diplomatic resources to maintain the visibility of the issue. There is a synergy or dynamism that can be generated through engaging in strategies that complement the state-led advocacy of a middle power coalition including the state-NGO partnership or policies that can operate independently of the state advocates.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹ See for example p. 39 of this thesis.

¹⁹² G. Evans and Y. Kawaguchi Y. "Eliminating Nuclear Threats: a Practical Agenda for Policy Makers," Report of the *International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament*, Tokyo/ Canberra, (2009).

¹⁹³ "Japan Today: Japan Unveils 11-Point Initiative to Push Global Disarmament," *Carnegie Proliferation News*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (2009) retrieved February 18, 2010 from <<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/newsletters/pronews/pronews20090428.htm>>.

¹⁹⁴ L. Baxter and J. A. Bishop, "Uncharted Ground: Canada, Middle Power Leadership, and Public Diplomacy," p. 84.

Chapter Five: The contribution of middle power coalitions to conventional and non-nuclear WMD disarmament

“Two things are very expensive in international life: promises when they succeed and threats when they fail.”¹⁹⁵

Middle power states have made extensive use of the coalition platform outside of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, generating conventional and non-nuclear WMD disarmament momentum. These examples reinforce the proposition that coalitions provide a viable and important platform for middle power disarmament diplomacy. These coalitions have been instrumental in the negotiation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (APM Treaty) of 1997 and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CMC) of 2008 as a part of the Ottawa Process and Oslo Process, respectively. These middle power coalitions have also improved the function of the non-nuclear WMD disarmament treaties (the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) of 1972 and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) of 1992). In particular, the JACKSNNZ biological weapons coalition aimed to provide support for the RevCon process. In addition, a coalition of middle powers has provided support for the negotiations for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). As Ko Colijn notes, middle powers have used their ‘like-mindedness’ as a useful tool to advocate for broadly-endorsed strategies, or specific country-directed or threat-directed measures.¹⁹⁶

This thesis argues that the middle power coalition strategies adopted outside of the non-proliferation regime can inform future nuclear disarmament diplomacy. These coalitions involve the same ‘usual suspect’ middle powers operating in very different normative environments. This comparison offers insight into alternative strategies that these coalitions can employ to take advantage of opportunities and constraints that may arise. The Ottawa and Oslo Processes present as more developed versions of the nuclear coalitions seen in the NAC and the NATO-5 examples. These coalitions suggest that there is potential for middle power states to improve their disarmament advocacy. In particular, these middle power coalitions have made extensive use of transnational advocacy networks, non-traditional or fast-track treaty negotiation and sideline events to support a RevCon style framework. As in

¹⁹⁵ Thomas Schelling quote in E. Sidlow and B. Henschen, *America at Odds*, Wadsworth Publishing, Fifth Edition, (July 2005) p. 380.

¹⁹⁶ K. Colijn, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: a medium-power concern?” p. 350.

preceding chapters, the analysis of these coalitions is framed by the moderator variables. This chapter focuses on the influence of the coalition capacity to frame the norm and the characteristics of the issue (the stakeholders, the states responsible (and liable), the utility of the weapons, the complexity of the solution and the feasibility of implementation) in more detail.

Conventional and non-nuclear WMD disarmament comparisons

This chapter does not seek to compare conventional and nuclear weapons, except to propose that the different characteristics of each weapons category can be accommodated within the template of moderator variables. When viewed from within this framework the conventional, non-nuclear WMD and nuclear disarmament processes can be loosely compared as the moderator variables enable a controlled comparison of these case studies. The study of nuclear disarmament can benefit from avoiding the arbitrary distinctions between conventional and strategic disarmament. Rather, the processes should be seen as complimentary and should be seen as part of a single spectrum of activity that seeks to limit the use, deployment and manufacture of certain categories of weapons deemed international humanitarian law.¹⁹⁷ The distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons has become increasingly blurred as technology advances and the role of weapons in security strategies changes. Moreover, the definition ‘weapons of mass destruction’ is a socially constructed category because their utility is first and foremost political and the deployment of ‘tactical nuclear warheads’ challenges these distinctions further.¹⁹⁸

The Ottawa Process and the middle power coalition

The Ottawa Process was driven by a coalition of middle power states in partnership with a transnational network of NGOs (the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)). In 1995, a group of pro-ban nations (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, Norway and Switzerland) formed the core of a group of middle power states that subsequently worked closely together throughout the Process. The Ottawa Process concluded

¹⁹⁷ The relationship between conventional and strategic weapons has long been contentious. Conventional weapons asymmetry is a key challenge for proponents of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons are perceived as the great equaliser (a balance to conventional asymmetry). Additionally, the largely unrestrained trade in conventional weapons is the by product of the restrictions in place around nuclear weapons. L. A. Dunn, “Some Reflections on the “Dove’s Dilemma” *International Organization*, 35, 1 Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain, (Winter 1981), p. 181.

¹⁹⁸ The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy “‘Tactical’ Nuclear Weapons: A dangerous anachronism,” NPT Briefings: 2010 and Beyond, retrieved May 14, 2009 from <<http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/npt2010%20B5%20-%20Tactical%20NWs.pdf>>, p. 3.

the APM Treaty in 14 months (relative to other treaty negotiation process this is an incredibly short timeframe). The middle power states in this coalition rejected the traditional disarmament negotiating forum (the CD) in favour of a series of independent conferences hosted by the states of the coalition. From the outset, the Ottawa Process parties (in particular the ICBL) outlined clear treaty objectives and pursued a goal orientated approach to achieve a full ban on these weapons. At the same time the core coalition quickly expanded its membership to include Brazil, France, Malaysia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe. This coalition endeavoured to consult with all stakeholders; but in reality it was only a few of the coalition states that were actively engaged in the drafting of the treaty. It was this departure from the traditional incremental approach (and consensus-based) based treaty negotiation in favour of a dynamic fast-track approach (led by a small negotiating team) that produced an APL Treaty draft in 14 months.¹⁹⁹

The Oslo Process and the middle power coalition

The Oslo Process recreated the dynamic of the Ottawa Process to address cluster munitions (which based on impact) posed the gravest danger to civilian populations.²⁰⁰ The coalition dynamic in the Ottawa Process created a supportive environment for the middle power states to pursue leadership positions and was reinforced by a positive rivalry between the leading states Canada, Sweden and Norway who engaged in a 'leadership competition.'²⁰¹ Spurred on by the success of the Ottawa Process, Norway initiated the Oslo Process in February 2007, which concluded the CMC in 2008. Norway led a coalition of middle power states which had previously been party to the Ottawa Process (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Peru and Sweden). The Oslo Process followed the same format (a series of conferences to negotiate and draft the treaty), a similar organisational structure, clear communications strategy, and many of the same NGO partners as had been involved in the Ottawa Process 10 years earlier. One new development concerned a number of the core cluster munitions coalition states which undertook unilateral efforts to restrict the use of cluster munitions prior to engaging in the campaign.²⁰² Because of the capacity previously

¹⁹⁹ R. M. Behringer, "Middle Powers and the Human Security Agenda," p. 305.

²⁰⁰ S. D. Goose, W. Boese, "Cluster Munitions: Ban Them," *Arms Control Today*, 38, 1, (January-February 2008), p. 6.

²⁰¹ J. A. Villacampa, "The Mine Ban Treaty, New Diplomacy and Human Security Ten Years Later," *European Political Science*, 7, 4, (December 2008), p. 519.

²⁰² W. Clarke "Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and human security initiatives: explaining success and failure," p. 10.

developed in the Ottawa Process the Oslo Process was noted for the highly efficient use of resources available, achieving a remarkable level of success in a very short space of time.

The middle power state-NGO partnership

The success of the Ottawa Process has been largely attributed to the dynamic relationship generated by middle power state/ NGO cooperation. This partnership was an early objective of the parties to the Process.²⁰³ The core group of middle power states demonstrated a remarkable degree of cooperation with the transnational NGO network (the International Campaign to ban Landmines (ICBL)) given the generally antagonistic relationship between states and NGOs.²⁰⁴ While the dynamism of the process is attributed to this cooperation, the diplomatic advances made could not have been achieved without the coalition of core middle power states, as the “the ICBL would never have been able to engage in the diplomatic lobbying necessary to negotiate a convention.”²⁰⁵ The middle power coalition provided the ICBL with unprecedented access to the negotiating process, including the ICBL members as on state delegations.²⁰⁶ In this way, the ICBL was able to place pressure on reluctant countries in forums that had previously been restricted to diplomats. In turn, the middle power state-NGO partnership strengthened the bargaining position of the middle power coalition. The ICBL provided the middle power states with information, resources and public support.²⁰⁷ In addition to the development of a functional negotiating system and the full backing of its own political system (including decision makers in the Department of Defence), the NGO community was instrumental in facilitating Canadian leadership of the Ottawa Process.²⁰⁸

²⁰³ F. O. Hampson, and H. Reid, “Coalition Diversity and Normative Legitimacy in Human Security Negotiations,” *International Negotiations*, 8, 1, (2003), p. 7

²⁰⁴ W. Clarke, “Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success and Failure,” p. 9.

²⁰⁵ M. Cameron, “Global Civil Society and the Ottawa Process: Lessons Learnt from the Movement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines,” *Canada Foreign Policy*, 7, 1, (Fall 1999), p. 85.

²⁰⁶ N. Michaud and L. Belanger, “Canadian Institutional Studies: New Orientations for a Middle Power Foreign Policy?” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 54, 1, (2000), p. 101.

²⁰⁷ W. Clarke, “Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success and Failure,” p. 6.

²⁰⁸ *Learn, Adapt, Succeed: Potential lessons from the Ottawa and Oslo processes for other disarmament and arms control challenges*, Summary of an informal symposium held in Glion, Switzerland, (November 19-20, 2008) retrieved May 12, 2009 from <<http://www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf3-act275.pdf>>.

Establishing a new norm

Both conventional weapons and non-nuclear WMD disarmament initiatives are based on the premise that normative constraints can challenge, and in some cases override, the utility value of these weapons. The Ottawa Process and the Oslo Process created strong international norms prohibiting the use of landmines and cluster munitions amongst states party to treaties, which is a significant achievement given that these weapons were previously the subject of widespread use. While both conventions fall short of the level of universality required to result in the full disarmament of these weapons categories (the largest stockholders remain outside of the treaties), the resulting prohibition even at current ratification levels carries significant normative weight. The norms created by the Ottawa and Oslo Processes have influenced the behaviour of outlier states and the international community's response to the use of these weapons. This shift in attitude can be noted in the United States landmines policy of 2004.²⁰⁹ The international community's widespread condemnation of Israel's use of cluster munitions against Lebanon in 2006, Russia's use of the weapons against Georgia in 2008 and the United Kingdom reversal of its position in May 2008 also give weight to this proposition.²¹⁰

It is the behaviour, and behaviour changes in these outlier states that is critical to this analysis. While the Ottawa and Oslo Processes have impacted future cost/benefits analysis of these states,²¹¹ the treaties have not (as yet) changed the existing standard of behaviour for the outlier states, as these states continue to deploy these weapons. In the 13 years since the adoption the APL Treaty, efforts to universalise this prohibition have not been successful and the primary stockholders of these weapons (China, India, Israel, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States) remain largely outside this treaty. A similar initiative in the nuclear weapons context may impact the *future* acquisition, deployment or use of nuclear weapons by changing the interest calculation, but is unlikely to change the current behaviours of these

²⁰⁹ This policy outlines United States' plans to cease deployment (outside of South Korea) from 2010. This policy does not explicitly refer to the anti-landmine norm; however, the United States ceased production of landmines shortly after the APM Treaty was opened for signature. See *United States: Country Profile*, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, retrieved March 7, 2009, from <<http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2004/usa.html>> and United States Department of State, *US Landmines Policy*, retrieved May 13, 2009 from <<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c11735.htm>>.

²¹⁰ UN denounces Israel cluster bombs, BBC News, (August 30, 2006), retrieved May 13, 2009 from <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5299938.stm>> and *Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Bill [HL]*, Research Paper 10/11 11 (February 2010), retrieved February 27, 2009 from <<http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/rp2010/rp10-011.pdf>>.

²¹¹ W. Clarke, "Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success and Failure," p. 10.

states. Such an approach may be useful to influence future nuclear policies (such as the right to use or deploy the weapons), but will not be appropriate if the objective requires a significant shift in current behaviour (such as requiring states dismantle production capacity).

Involving the outlier states in treaty negotiations

A number of the great powers were involved in the early movement to ban landmines, but remain outside the treaty framework because the Ottawa Process did not sufficiently address strategic, practical and financial concerns of these states. Similarly, key stockholders were not involved in the Oslo Process negotiations. Early (landmine) disarmament efforts initiated by France and the United States were based around the CD and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).²¹² The Clinton Administration demonstrated United States commitment to a moratorium and a twelve-part 'United States-United Kingdom control regime' and attempted to find a compromise between detractors (primarily military) and proponents of the ban. However, the United States was torn between its military duties as a superpower and a desire to pursue a moral foreign policy.²¹³ The ban on the use of these weapons was complicated by engagement in the former Yugoslavia and South Korea. Like the Ottawa Process, the Oslo Process was motivated by frustrations in the CD regarding the slow progress on efforts to address the humanitarian impact of these weapons. Many commentators and states argue that the rejection of the CD weakens the international humanitarian law effort²¹⁴ strength of prohibition derived from consensus on the issue. This argument hinges on the "notion that the CCW has "all the stakeholders" involved and that "major powers" and the big users, producers, and stockpilers of cluster munitions are only willing to engage in the CCW context."²¹⁵

The goal-orientated, fast track approach undertaken by both Ottawa and Oslo Processes resulted in two of the most comprehensive disarmament treaties to date, prohibiting the stockpiling and use of these weapons and providing compensation to the victims of these weapons. The key failing however, is the inability to capture the outlying states within the treaty prohibitions. Given the seriousness (and high-stakes) of the nuclear disarmament

²¹² V. Kitchen, "From Rhetoric to Reality: Canada, the United States and the Ottawa Process to ban landmines," *International Journal*, 57, (Winter 2002), p. 40.

²¹³ Ibid. p. 38.

²¹⁴ Ibid, p. 42.

²¹⁵ S. D. Goose, W. Boese, "Cluster Munitions: Ban Them," p. 6.

debate, it is not appropriate or feasible to rely only a normative prohibition; rather the legal (treaty) provisions must include the stockholders of the weapons.²¹⁶ It was a fatal negotiating flaw on the part of the Ottawa Process parties to refuse exemptions, leaving the United States with little choice to refrain from entering into the APM Treaty.²¹⁷ In the context of nuclear disarmament a fast-track approach to treaty negotiation may prove insufficient to advance the disarmament norm beyond the current level of support and such an exclusive negotiating process may also prove to politically divisive (defeating the purpose of multilateral nuclear disarmament). While the Ottawa/ Oslo Process may not easily translate into the nuclear disarmament context and a full ban on nuclear weapons may not be currently feasible, on a more specific, strategic (operational level) there are a number of lessons that could be translated. In particular the dynamic of the parties to the coalitions and the strategies employed to support the norm promotion.

Framing of the norm

The landmines and cluster munitions conventions were successful because they lent themselves to a single norm, one that supported “their outright ban to halt the humanitarian devastation under one single international treaty.”²¹⁸ The Ottawa and Oslo Processes were also successful because the middle power states framed the new norms by grafting these onto existing norms and standards of behaviour including humanitarian law and the ‘just war doctrine’ that included the norm of civilian protection.²¹⁹ The Oslo Process was able to frame the anti-cluster munitions norm an extension of the landmines norm rather establish a new one.²²⁰ The drafters of the CMC made explicit reference to the 1997 APM Treaty and the norm against antipersonnel landmines that it created. The two weapons categories had previously been treated as one, but were separated so as to enable more rapid progress on the landmines issue (which at the time was a more straightforward case).²²¹ Both the Ottawa and

²¹⁶ States are not able to ensure compliance with a normative prohibition. This low standard of enforcement and the absence of compliance mechanisms (outside of a treaty or agreement) would not be sufficient to contribute to nuclear disarmament. As the non-nuclear WMD disarmament section below illustrates, WMD disarmament treaties are not uniformly complied with. Moreover, as the NPT demonstrates, effective nuclear-related agreements require rigorous enforcement and compliance mechanisms.

²¹⁷ J. Wurst, “Closing In On a Landmine Ban: The Ottawa Process and U.S. Interests,” *Arms Control Today*, (June-July 1997) retrieved August 3, 2008 from <<http://www.armscontrol.org/print/225>>.

²¹⁸ D. Garcia, *Making New International Norms: The Small Arms Case*, BCSIA Discussion Paper 2003-13, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, (April 2004) p. 16.

²¹⁹ W. Clarke, “Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and human security initiatives: explaining success and failure,” p. 5.

²²⁰ Ibid, p. 11.

²²¹ K R. Rutherford, S. Brem and R A. Matthew, *Reframing the Agenda, The Impact of NGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International Security Policy*, p. 26.

Oslo Processes framed the debate in the public realm maintaining the visibility of the issue through “symbolic” and “moral leverage” politics.²²² The ICBL in particular was effective in ‘naming and shaming’ the states that were responsible for the use of the weapons through a graphic and visual depiction of the causal story (the states responsible and the individual victims). These Processes also framed the debate by recasting the security issues in humanitarian rather than purely military terms. These Processes presented a clear solution in the form of a legal and normative framework for the eradication of these weapons.²²³

Middle power nuclear weapons disarmament coalitions could benefit from appropriating a number of these Ottawa and Oslo Process strategies. It follows that advocates of disarmament would be more persuasive if they framed the process of disarmament as a humanitarian issue, developed a persuasive case around the utility of the weapon and compensated for the weapons (replacement) value.²²⁴ The different characteristics of the weapons and the disarmament process come into play here. These differences do not change the strategies themselves, but rather dictate how the strategies could be best used.

Middle power advocates of nuclear disarmament have emphasised the humanitarian aspect,²²⁵ but have fallen short raising the profile of the issue to the level that the Ottawa and Oslo Processes were able to. Nuclear disarmament is a tricky issue that may not be able to be completely recast as a humanitarian concern given the strategic value of the weapons. Instead, middle power advocates that wish to frame a persuasive case for nuclear disarmament must consider the challenge posed by the utility of the weapon. As the cluster munitions example demonstrates, the utility of the weapon complicates the disarmament process. The utility value of cluster munitions caused this category to be separated from the landmines issue and has resulted in a less comprehensive CMC as a result of a number of problematic clauses (relating to this utility).²²⁶ Closely associated with the utility value of the weapon is the replacement value. In the context of nuclear disarmament, there is currently no viable alternative to nuclear deterrence (or rather none that have been persuasive). By

²²² M. Keck and K. Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, p. 19.

²²³ K. E. Kjellman, “Norms, persuasion and practice: Land mine Monitor and civil society,” p. 955.

²²⁴ T. Young, “Missile defense: The future of NATO burden sharing?” *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, (May 1, 2010), retrieved June 30, 2010 from < <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/missile-defense-the-future-of-nato-burden-sharing>>.

²²⁵ The NAC consistently referred to the humanitarian consequences and humanitarian as a drivers for their disarmament policies, see for example *A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda*, Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden.

²²⁶ W. Boese, “Cluster Munition, Anti-Vehicle Mine Limits Sought,” p. 41.

comparison, conventional weapons disarmament is made more likely by the relative ease by which this weapon can be replaced with another (although one that is more in line with humanitarian law). Middle power advocates of nuclear disarmament may not have the capacity to identify a viable, non-military strategy to replace these weapons; however, disarmament initiatives that focus on more specific objectives could benefit from this understanding. As discussed in Chapter Two, disarmament efforts are unlikely to succeed if they are seen as a relative decrease in security or a state position.²²⁷ For example, the withdrawal of tactical nuclear warheads from NATO states may need to be coupled with a corresponding security commitment from the United States and Russia parties involved.

Complexity: the small arms and light weapons example

Progress on the norm of nuclear disarmament is characterised by the complex norms that govern nuclear behaviour. Despite holding positions at opposite ends of the conflict escalation spectrum, nuclear disarmament initiatives operate in a similarly complex normative environment to efforts to curb the trade in SALW. For example there are multiple and often competing norms that govern licit and illicit trade in both weapons.²²⁸ Navigating this complexity has proved to be a challenge for both nuclear and SALW disarmament, but must be taken into account when developing viable disarmament policies. Unlike the antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions examples, the causal story (the identification of the states responsible) is more complex and must be treated with an appropriate level of nuance. It is not a simple case of legitimate/ illegitimate but rather a balancing act between rights and obligations (particularly where extended deterrence, nuclear sharing arrangements, or the nuclear industry are considered). The normative environment that surrounds SALW (like nuclear weapons) suggests that these weapons are “legitimate tools for individual and state defence needs and raise a more complex management framework.”²²⁹ As a result, agreement on a number of different norms addressing the various aspects of weapons related activity may be more pragmatic.²³⁰ Rather than setting up new norms to compete against existing standards, disarmament advocates may benefit from addressing more specific issues

²²⁷ T. Young, “Missile defense: The future of NATO burden sharing?”

²²⁸ There are multiple norms covering weapons manufacture, possession, transfer, deployment and use. Within the non-proliferation regime there are strong norms regarding licit and illicit trade; however, this distinction is not always clear cut as the US-India and China-Pakistan nuclear supply relationships demonstrate. See G. Dyer and F. Bokhari, “China-Pakistan reactor deal to open fresh US rift,” *Financial Times*, (September 23, 2010), retrieved September 24, 2010 from <<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/83db2ac8-c72d-11df-aeb1-00144feab49a.html#axzz15hcF7WT8>>.

²²⁹ D. Garcia, “Making New International Norms: The Small Arms Case,” p. 36

²³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 25

rather than focus solely on the larger anti-nuclear weapons norm (such as restricting capacity to test, employ or use these weapons).

Moreover, unlike the antipersonnel landmine and cluster munitions counterpart, the movement to regulate SALW at an international level occurs within the UN system. The UN has retained control of the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations so as involve all parties in consensus-based decision making.²³¹ This traditional forum provides a greater chance that the negotiated outcome will be met with broad acceptance; however as the preceding discussion has alluded, concluding such an agreement may be a time-consuming process that is low on substance.²³² SALW efforts adopted the traditional Prep Com/ UN Conference dynamic, beginning with the 2001 *UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects*. The elements of procedural wrangling seen in WMD disarmament and arms control efforts were apparent in the SALW context (including the first Prep Com that could not even decide on the date or venue of the Conference).²³³

Middle power nuclear disarmament coalitions in the SALW operate in a similar environment to the nuclear disarmament coalitions. There is not a lot of room for middle powers to manoeuvre in terms of policy positions or in the actual architecture of the negotiations themselves. Instead middle powers involved in SALW disarmament have supported and facilitated the UN Process. Belgium, Canada, Japan, Mali, Norway, South Africa and Switzerland formed a core coalition of middle powers within the SALW process. While these states are skilled negotiators, these states have so far failed to gain ground by influencing the agenda.²³⁴ This coalition has organised a series of meetings and workshops leading up to the UN conference between 1998 and 2001 to address all aspects of the SALW issue.²³⁵ The conferences of note include the Norwegian conference in 1998 establishing the “Elements of Common Understanding” and the Belgian conference in 1999 announcing the 98 government ‘Brussels Call for Action.’²³⁶ This group demonstrated characteristics that can be identified with middle power coalition approach including the division of labour and burden sharing which enables these states to focus on specific (niche roles) (i.e. Belgium (the Brussels Call

²³¹ S. Brem, “Too much too soon? NGOs and Middle Powers in need for more coordination on small arms activities,” in *Reframing the Agenda: The Impact of NGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International Security*, Praeger: Westport CT (2003). p. 44.

²³² R. M. Behringer, “Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda,” p. 305.

²³³ S. Brem, “Too much too soon? NGOs and Middle Powers in need for more coordination on small arms activities,” p. 47.

²³⁴ R. M. Behringer, “Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda,” p. 305.

²³⁵ Ibid. p. 330.

²³⁶ Ibid.

for Action); Canada (international arms register); Japan (ammunition study); Mali (assistance to states); Norway (host of meetings); South Africa (proposal of UN Conference); and Switzerland (marking and tracing expertise)).²³⁷

Despite these attempts to build a middle power coalition around specific issues such as an international mechanism to trace small arms, transparency issues or to address the humanitarian impacts, these issues were only included in a weak form in the Program of Action.²³⁸ This middle power coalition effort increased cross-sectional dialogue and cooperation, but beyond this consultation these states were unable to deliver actionable outcomes.²³⁹

Biological weapons disarmament

As the first disarmament treaty to completely ban an entire class of weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 is a normative precedent for nuclear disarmament; however, it also illustrates the challenges that plague ambitious WMD disarmament commitments. While the “Convention is an indispensable legal and political instrument that reinforces the widespread condemnation of biological weapons,”²⁴⁰ this treaty is very much a ‘work in progress’ as it lacks strict verification and enforcement capabilities required to ensure uniform compliance. The treaty framework itself is inadequate to rigorously monitor and enforce compliance;²⁴¹ nevertheless, the way in which states parties to the treaty have developed the framework through a series of incremental steps within the Review Conference process could be useful when building an effective nuclear disarmament regime.²⁴²

²³⁷ S. Brem, “Too much too soon? NGOs and Middle Powers in need for more coordination on small arms activities” p. 49.

²³⁸ Ibid, p. 51. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, in All Its Aspects. The Programme of Action (PoA) includes a number of measures at the national, regional and global levels, in the areas of legislation, destruction of weapons that were confiscated, seized, or collected, as well as international cooperation and assistance to strengthen the ability of States in identifying and tracing illicit arms and light weapons.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ J. Rissanen, “NTI Issue Brief: The Biological Weapons Convention,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies (March 2003), retrieved September 12, 2009 from <http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_28a.html>.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid. Unlike the NPT RevCons, the BWC RevCons have been effective in orchestrating regime development. In particular, progressive BWC RevCons have focused on declarations (past possession, efforts undertaken to destroy or divert relevant items to peaceful purposes and national legislation), cooperative efforts to develop peaceful programs and information exchange (including training of personnel, and the transfer of materials and equipment.)

The JACKSNNZ coalition

In the context of biological and chemical weapons disarmament the JACKSNNZ group, is the most notable example of middle power coalition activity. This group emerged in the lead up to the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Regime, based on the failings of the Fifth RevCon in 2001 to negotiate a verification mechanism.²⁴³ The states parties failed to come to a consensus on a composite text of a verification protocol. This protocol has initially been investigated by an expert group on verification (VEREX) and then the States parties authorised the Ad Hoc Group under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary to negotiate a verification protocol. The failure to achieve consensus on this issue which dominated the 2001 RevCon was due to difficulties in resolving the outstanding issues, including the small quantities involved, the legit and illicit trade and dual use concerns. Most importantly though, the United States rejected the text on the grounds that the intrusive inspections the biotechnology industry and government bio-defence program.²⁴⁴ It is in this context that the JACKSNNZ group (comprised of Japan, Australia, Canada, (South) Korea, Switzerland, Norway and New Zealand) intended to balance the larger groupings of the EU, within the Western Group, with its coordinated position.²⁴⁵ The group espoused the “middle ground on which the Sixth Review Conference converged” drawing on the Latin American Group of 12 and the EU-plus group of 36 recommendations.²⁴⁶

JACKSNNZ announced itself as an informal group of countries, sharing similar views, working to share ideas, information and approaches on the various issues addressed at the Sixth Review Conference.²⁴⁷ This group presented national papers, in consultation with each other, but took a “tactical decision to refrain from submitting text systematically, preferring to rely on their individual working papers issued in advance and on offering comment on other draft texts during the committee stage of the conference.”²⁴⁸ The group appears to value informality preferring loose consultation to the more arduous procedures of endorsements (similar to the process adopted by the European Union states). If a JACKSNNZ state wanted

²⁴³ N. Sims, *The Future of Biological Disarmament*, Routledge, First Edition, (April 2009), p. 110.

²⁴⁴ J. Rissanen, “NTI Issue Brief: The Biological Weapons Convention.”

²⁴⁵ Oliver Meier, “News Analysis: Bioweapons Treaty Progress Predicted,” *Arms Control Today*, retrieved June 6, 2009 from <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_11/NABio>.

²⁴⁶ N. Sims, *The Future of Biological Disarmament*, p. 110.

²⁴⁷ Ambassador M. Grinius (Canada), *JACKSNNZ Opening Statement*, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on the Destruction, Fourth Meeting, Geneva, (December 10-14, 2007), retrieved June 24, 2009 from <http://www.opbw.org/.../BWC_MSP_2007_Statement-Canada-JACKSNNZ_E.pdf> p. 2.

²⁴⁸ N. A. Sims, “The status of the Biological Weapons Convention in relation to the prevention of bioterrorism,” p. 167.

to distance itself from a paper, it could do so by suggesting it was a national working paper only. The group also refrained from circulating draft text for the final declaration collectively- Australia, New Zealand and Japan circulated textual proposals individually.²⁴⁹ This loose procedural character may be the key to this group's success and continued viability, and is an organised but informal dynamic that could be exported to the nuclear context.

The JACKSNNZ group played a significant part in the successful outcome of the Sixth Review Conference, breaking the “stranglehold of the increasingly anachronistic triad of Eastern, Western and NAM groupings.”²⁵⁰ The traditional regional groupings that dominate the formal management of such multilateral meetings are weakened by emergence of subgroups; as a result less tension is produced.²⁵¹ The JACKSNNZ group's loose structure and strictly consultative character is “an advantage over the more tightly constrained groupings of States Parties” within the regime.²⁵² There is potential for even greater significance for the future of the BWC as “components of a more dynamic pattern of conference diplomacy, especially if they find ways of using the traditional group structure (which is unlikely to disappear) to their advantage.”²⁵³ While the JACKSNNZ group were instrumental in orchestrating the convergence of views that resulted in a successful outcome at the Sixth Review Conference, success was also due to the fact that the actors involved confined their ambitions to modest objectives with the realistic aim to secure a consensus outcome.²⁵⁴ Other groups of states that converged on the middle ground included the ‘EU-plus 13’ and the ‘Latin American 12’ (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay).²⁵⁵

The JACKSNNZ grouping remains in place between the Review Conferences.²⁵⁶ These states are involved in enhancing national legislation, regional and sub-regional cooperation

²⁴⁹ N. A. Sims, *The Future of Biological Weapons Disarmament*, p. 86.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ O. Meier, “News Analysis: Bioweapons Treaty Progress Predicted.”

²⁵² N. A. Sims, *The Future of Biological Weapons Disarmament*, p. 110.

²⁵³ Ibid, p. 85.

²⁵⁴ N. A. Sims, “New Hope after the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention,” *The Nonproliferation Review*, 14, 2, (July 2007), p. 351.

²⁵⁵ R. Guthrie, “Rising Out of the Doldrums: Report on the BWC Review Conference,” *Disarmament Diplomacy*, 84, (Spring 2007), retrieved March 12, 2008 from < www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd84/index.htm>.

²⁵⁶ This is an evolution from the previous groupings that had occurred in the diplomacy of the BWC: the mainly-NAM reformists coalescing with Canada and Sweden at the First Review Conference (where they were known as the ‘like-minded’ group’) were followed by the Ireland-Pakistan-Sweden group at the Second Review Conference, N. A. Sims, *The Future of Biological Weapons Disarmament*, p. 85.

activities as part of their Security Council Resolution 1540 obligations.²⁵⁷ The states divided their labour at the 2006 Review Conference, (in order of the acronym) the states addressed: Japan (national implementation measures), Australia (universalisation), Canada (accountability framework), Korea, Republic of (universalisation- a political-economy analysis of incentives and disincentives to BWC adherence), Switzerland (confidence building measures), Norway (secretariat), NZ (programme of work for the next intersessional process). It remains to be seen if this middle power coalition can achieve what the Ad Hoc group could not. Given that discussions on the protocol have been underway since the 1994 VEREX report, the longevity of the coalition will be vital to this process.

Nicholas Sims, as the primary authority on the JACKSNNZ group, has a number of recommendations on the future utility of this grouping within the BWC that are also relevant for this thesis. These recommendations look to the long term viability of the coalition, in particular to the next RevCon scheduled to take place in 2011. Sims emphasises the need to for the coalition member state to develop specialised areas of expertise through a division of labour. The formal division of labour stands out as a pragmatic and achievable objective to extract the greatest advantage out of current resources and capacity. This more formalised approach commits states to delivering on their area of expertise, increases the investment of each state in the coalition and is also a more efficient use of resources as it incorporates the individual state actions already underway. Middle power nuclear coalitions could benefit from this approach. The NAC in particular relied on an organic division of labour rather than formal positions. Such a division could build on established areas of interest and increase the efficiency of their initiatives. A number of NAC states have already specialised and have invested individual projects such as the for example the New Zealand, Switzerland and East-West Institute initiative on de-alerting.²⁵⁸ There may be a way to bring these initiatives under the NAC umbrella. This division of labour could conceivably contribute to the cohesion of a coalition like the NAC presenting a way to work through the issues that are causing internal disputes. It also allows states that have particular interest (or current investment) in an issue area to bring this work under the NAC umbrella. This diversifies the support for the issue or concerns, while at the same time raising the profile of the NAC. Sims also suggests that the JACKSNNZ could formalise the group's structure to include the proposition of draft

²⁵⁷ Ambassador M. Grinius (Canada), *JACKSNNZ Opening Statement*, p. 1.

²⁵⁸ *Reframing Nuclear De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals*, The East West Institute, New York, (2009), retrieved May 28, 2010 from <http://www.ewi.info/reframing_dealert>.

language as a group and develop middle ground consensus around a major conference deliverable.²⁵⁹ This in fact reflects the NAC approach to the 2000 RevCon, suggesting that informality of the JACKSNNZ activity was not successful. Sims suggests that the structure and the formality of the coalition is critical to the success of the initiative.

Conclusions

This chapter has considered middle power coalitions in a number of operating environment from the fast-track Ottawa and Oslo style processes to the incremental development of the BWC. It has become clear that a dramatic shift from the NPT RevCon environment or drastic change to the middle power coalition may not be viable. Rather, more specific organisational changes and modified strategies may be more important in the context of nuclear disarmament. Unlike the Ottawa and Oslo Processes, the complexity of the NPT regime and normative environment demands that a more nuanced and subtle approach be employed by middle power advocates of nuclear disarmament.

Middle powers can still adopt some (or part) of the strategies employ in the Ottawa and Oslo Processes. These states could mimic the fast track approach with specific or more limited objectives. Middle powers will be more effective when isolating and addressing a specific issue that can be covered by a single norm, rather than attempting to advocate for a blanket prohibition of nuclear weapons (where are multiple of competing norms already in place). In this case it would be much easier for middle power advocates to clearly frame a specific problem and develop a policy solution to suit, particularly if there is a clear casual story involved. A number of discrete *Ottawa and Oslo-style* initiatives could work in parallel for example initiatives could focus on de-alerting, tactical nuclear weapons, the legality of the use of the weapons, or an FMCT.

There are a range of forums available to middle power advocates of nuclear disarmament. These states may choose to contribute to support the CD and the NPT RevCon process with conferences or side events such as those held by the SALW middle power coalition. Such conferences could facilitate dialogue and negotiations for a policy position. These sideline events (or conferences) create formal or informal spaces to debate policy (reminiscent of the approach used by the MPI). The other option is to move outside of the traditional, consensus based forms and opt for an independent, fast-track treaty negotiation process similar to that adopted by the Ottawa and Oslo Processes. As previously mentioned such a process may do

²⁵⁹ N. A. Sims, *The Future of Biological Weapons Disarmament*, p. 87.

more harm than good to multilateral nuclear disarmament. There is scope to develop a strategy somewhere in between including a series of conferences parallel to the traditional UN forums designed to facilitate dialogue on an issue of concern or negotiate an auxiliary agreement.

CHAPTER SIX: State level analysis

This thesis is premised on the assumption that middle powers have the capacity to influence the nuclear decision-making of other, more powerful states by advocating for a nuclear disarmament norm in a coalition comprised of 'like-minded' middle powers. This thesis also makes the claim that middle power states will tend towards coalition behaviour and can actively direct this strategy; however, middle power states will only pursue strategies they perceive to be available to them and this is dependent on the domestic and international constraints that the individual states face. This chapter addresses the disarmament diplomacy of four middle power states: Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Norway. While the four states are western, liberal-democratic, open, affluent and trade-dependent industrial societies,²⁶⁰ these states represent a diverse geographical and political spread. They also vary in terms of size, capacity and political orientation (with varying degrees of proximity to the great powers). These states have all adopted a principled approach to the advocacy of disarmament and human security norms, and share a common aspiration to present their policies as good international citizens.²⁶¹

This chapter considers the drivers for disarmament diplomacy in each state, the tendency towards cooperative behaviour, and the likelihood that these middle powers would engage in a middle power nuclear disarmament coalition. This chapter will also consider the foreign policy areas in which these states have specialised and how this influences their choice of diplomatic strategy. The opportunities and limitations inherent upon each of the states demonstrates the nuances of state involvement in norm advocacy. Within this group these states have followed very different paths to advocate for nuclear disarmament and demonstrate a wide range of advocacy strategies.²⁶²

The contribution of state level analysis

State level analysis is important for three reasons. Firstly, foreign policy decision-making occurs at the state level and is constrained by the domestic political system, the domestic assessment of security priorities and the various international agreements to which the state is

²⁶⁰ K. Colijn, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: a medium-power concern?" p. 349.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid, p. 352.

a party.²⁶³ Secondly, while the middle power coalition creates a dynamic that is greater than the sum of its parts, the advocacy of the coalition is ultimately dependent upon the contribution of the states involved. Thirdly, state foreign policy preferences and the domestic perception of international influences determines the diplomatic strategies adopted by these states. This state level analysis illustrates the impact of the following moderator variables on coalition advocacy: (1) The capacity of the norm entrepreneur (to exercise leadership on disarmament, to develop a niche area of expertise and to engage in state-NGO cooperation), (2) The framing of the new norm by the middle power norm entrepreneur (states will frame the norm such that it is consistent with their own values, reflecting the state level drivers for nuclear disarmament advocacy), and (3) the international environment in which these states operate (this environment is specific to each state, including domestic and international constraints). The dynamics of international politics will ultimately determine whether or not a middle power state engages in cooperative nuclear disarmament norm advocacy.

Canadian middle power foreign policy

Canada has established a reputation as a strong supporter of nuclear disarmament within the UN system. Canada was the first state to claim a role as a middle power,²⁶⁴ a role that entailed mediating between the Cold War adversaries, the United States and Russia. Having refrained from a nuclear weapons program (despite being involved in the Manhattan Project), Canada is reliant on multilateral institutions to guarantee security. Despite having also developed a reputation as an active participant in multilateral forums, engaging in diplomatic activism on selected human security (second and third agenda) items,²⁶⁵ Canada's nuclear disarmament advocacy is much more restrained. It appears unlikely that Canada would engage in a middle power coalition on nuclear disarmament.

The Canadian 'human security agenda'

Canada was instrumental in the development of the human security agenda.²⁶⁶ Canadian diplomacy on this issue peaked in the 1990s with the 'Axworthy Doctrine' under the direction of former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy. This doctrine articulated the link

²⁶³ Nuclear Threat Initiative, *At the Cross Roads: Catastrophe or Cooperation*, Annual Report (2008), p. 5. retrieved December 23, 2009 from <http://www.nti.org/b_aboutnti/annual_report_2008.pdf>.

²⁶⁴ D. MacFhionnbhairr, P. Lewis, M. Laker and L. F. Machado, "Constructing a New Agenda," p. 273.

²⁶⁵ See A. F. Cooper, R. Higgot and K. R. Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*.

²⁶⁶ P. M Bernard, "Canada and human security: from the Axworthy doctrine to middle power internationalism," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 36, 2, (Summer 2006), p. 233.

between nuclear disarmament, conventional weapons disarmament and the human security agenda.²⁶⁷ The Canadian human security agenda involved the 1998 Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) report, *Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty First Century*, the Ottawa Process on Landmines and the Canada-Norway Partnership for Action: Lysoen Declaration of 1998.²⁶⁸ During this period Canada's preference for traditional multilateral engagement gave way to a more activist variant, and involved new diplomatic strategies such as 'public,' 'fast-track,' and 'just in time' diplomacy.²⁶⁹ It was these strategies that contributed to the success of the Ottawa Process.²⁷⁰ While Canada came late to the ICBL, it superseded the efforts of other nations to assume a leadership role. Through this leadership on the human security agenda Canada was able to demonstrate an independent foreign policy, without jeopardising its relationship with the great powers (in particular the United States).

Canadian nuclear disarmament diplomacy

Canada's articulation of the link between human security and nuclear disarmament was unique as it was the first time that this connection had been made at a state level; however, Canada was unsuccessful in this attempt to reframe the nuclear disarmament debate as this effort failed to gain the public profile that the Ottawa Process received.²⁷¹ The *Canadian Parliamentary Report* published in 1998 recommended that Canada take a lead role to reduce the political value of nuclear weapons through the legislative process.²⁷² This report failed to influence Canadian foreign policy, as the Canadian government attempted to downplay human security aspects of nuclear disarmament, mindful of United States reluctance to engage on the issue.²⁷³ As a result, Canadian disarmament diplomacy has developed an uneven character.²⁷⁴ On one hand, Canada has demonstrated considerable will and capacity to

²⁶⁷ T.S. Hataley and K. Nossal, "The Limits of the Human Security Agenda: The Case of Canada's Response to the Timor Crisis," *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 16, 1, (February 2004), p. 9.

²⁶⁸ The Lysoen Declaration was in essence and action plan on human security. R. M. Behringer, "Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda," p. 305.

²⁶⁹ A. F. Cooper "The evolution of Multilateralism in an Intermediate State: The reorientation of Canadian Strategy in the Economic and Security Arenas," p. 2.

²⁷⁰ As discussed in Chapter 4. See for example p. 51.

²⁷¹ Rideau Institute, *Restoring Canada's Disarmament Policies*, Expert Seminar, Ottawa, (February 3-4, 2008), <<http://www.rideauinstitute.ca/file-library/disarmament-seminar.pdf>> see also in M. Hanson, "The Advocacy States: Their Normative Role Before and After the U.S. calls for Nuclear Zero."

²⁷² M. Hanson, "Advancing Disarmament in the Face of Great Power Reluctance: The Canadian Contribution," *Working Paper no. 37*, The Liu Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, (2001).

²⁷³ D. Roche, "Stuck in the Middle? Canada's Record and Role in Promoting Disarmament," *Disarmament Diplomacy*, 53 (December 2000), retrieved February 16, 2007 from <www.acronym.org.uk/53roche.htm>.

²⁷⁴ A. F. Cooper, "The evolution of Multilateralism in an Intermediate State: The Reorientation of Canadian Strategy in the Economic and Security Arenas," p. 4.

upgrade its multilateral activity in selected areas of the international agenda where there is scope and space for this activity (the Ottawa Process);²⁷⁵ however, there has been little room for Canada to move on the nuclear issue (particularly in the last decade). Canada's working papers on NPT institutional capacity have not been widely received. In addition, Canada has an inconsistent UNGA voting pattern, which again, has largely been due to the relationship with the United States.

The influence of the international environment

Canada has sought to play a role in the space around the great powers; however, external constraints have played a large role in Canada's nuclear disarmament diplomacy.²⁷⁶ Canada's involvement in the formation of the NPT demonstrates the constraints of great power dominance. Along with other middle powers, Brazil, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Sweden, Canada played an important, but ultimately peripheral role in the drafting of the Treaty.²⁷⁷ Canada adopted an important technical and legal role and was able to alter the substantive text, but not able to incorporate stronger compliance and enforcement measures into the draft.²⁷⁸ Because "the arms control process was a sub-set of the central political relationship between the two superpowers, it was conducted primarily as a dialogue between Moscow and Washington. As such, the middle powers were excluded from the main negotiating table."²⁷⁹ This set clear perimeters for Canadian nuclear disarmament diplomacy, which has remained primarily concerned with technical or practical issues ever since. While supporting disarmament in principle, Canada's advocacy has focused on scientific and technical cooperation, and institutional development.²⁸⁰ An example of this sort of organisational-level initiative includes Canada's role in the NPT Review and Extension Conference. Canada generated further support for the NPT's indefinite extension by collecting signature to demonstrate that such a vote would be successful.²⁸¹ While Canada is supportive of disarmament and a balanced or progressive approach the non-proliferation regime obligations, Canada has refrained from direct advocacy of the disarmament issue.

²⁷⁵ K. Colijn, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: a medium-power concern?" p. 356.

²⁷⁶ P. M Bernard, "Canada and human security: from the Axworthy doctrine to middle power internationalism," p. 233.

²⁷⁷ A. F. Cooper, "The evolution of Multilateralism in an Intermediate State: The Reorientation of Canadian Strategy in the Economic and Security Arenas," p. 9.

²⁷⁸ C. Ungerer, "Influence Without Power: Middle Powers and Arms Control Diplomacy During the Cold War," p. 393.

²⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 399.

²⁸⁰ R. Johnson, "Is the NPT up to the challenge of proliferation?" *Disarmament Forum*, 4, (2004), p. 16.

²⁸¹ Ibid. p. 12.

The potential for Canadian engagement in a middle power nuclear disarmament coalition

Canada's multilateral approach extends to membership of the many nuclear agreements and has historically included strong support in the initial stages of multilateral arms control initiatives. Canada has invested diplomatic resources into negotiations leading to the creation of new regimes.²⁸² Nonetheless, Canada has not committed to a middle power coalition in this field. Canada was approached by the NAC shortly before the 1999 UNGA. Canada declined join the NAC, but was supportive of the NAC objectives as they reflected steps already taken to combat a "new nuclear real politic being used by proliferators in Nuclear weapons states to justify the proliferation or retention of nuclear weapons."²⁸³ Canada's decision to abstain from the 1999 NAC-sponsored UNGA resolution vote, due to NATO membership, was accompanied by a commitment to engage in further discussions.²⁸⁴ The human security agenda still informs Canadian public policy, but the need establish independent views has become less of a priority, while a close relationship to the United States has increasingly become a priority.²⁸⁵ In this context it is unlikely that Canada will adopt more maximalist policy on nuclear disarmament without a sustained and clear shift in the policies of the United States.

Japanese middle power foreign policy

Japanese nuclear disarmament advocacy is characterised by moral leadership and pragmatic diplomacy; however, Japan has also engaged in nuclear-hedging under the umbrella of the United States extended nuclear deterrence. Japan has contributed to non-proliferation norms and has supported a number of disarmament-related, nuclear security initiatives such as the CTBT and FMCT negotiations; however, as an advocate of disarmament, Japan has preferred to maintain independence from other disarmament advocates and initiatives. Japanese disarmament diplomacy has at times been pessimistically labelled 'karaoke diplomacy',²⁸⁶ in reference to the dominance of Japan's relationship with the United States and concerns over regional security to in preference to progress on disarmament. State sponsored initiatives such as the recent ICNND (a cooperative effort with the Australian government) suggest that Japan may consider a more cooperative approach to nuclear disarmament advocacy.

²⁸² K. Colijn, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Medium Power Concern?" p. 351

²⁸³ D. MacFhionnbhairr, P. Lewis, M. Laker and L. F. Machado, "Constructing a New Agenda," p. 273.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ K. Colijn, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Medium Power Concern?" p. 348.

²⁸⁶ R. J. Samuels, "Japan's Goldilocks Strategy," *The Washington Quarterly*, 29, 4 (Autumn 2006), p. 112.

Nevertheless, Japan is also unlikely to engage in a middle power nuclear disarmament coalition activity.

Japan's unique relationship to nuclear weapons

Japan is in a unique position as a nuclear disarmament advocate. With a pacifist constitution and defence oriented security policy it is heavily reliant on the security of the United States-Japan alliance and extended nuclear deterrence. While the three non-nuclear principles form the bedrock of Japan's nuclear policy (and these are deeply embedded cultural and political norms), Japan has also invested heavily in a highly developed nuclear energy industry.²⁸⁷ This dual track policy of 'nuclear denial' and 'nuclear approval',²⁸⁸ in effect provides Japan with a latent nuclear status.²⁸⁹ It is this "threshold status",²⁹⁰ that positions Japan as uniquely situated to act as a leader and entrepreneur in the field of nuclear weapons disarmament having rejected weapons acquisition as not essential for security;²⁹¹ however, these policies of nuclear hedging inhibit as well as empower their disarmament advocacy. Nuclear hedging decreases the legitimacy of Japanese calls for disarmament (when it is unwilling to 'come from under the umbrella' of United States extended deterrence).²⁹²

Japanese nuclear disarmament diplomacy

As the only state to have experienced a nuclear attack, Japan has a broad domestic anti-nuclear consensus and an active, internationalist orientated NGO community focusing predominantly on maximalist disarmament strategies. This is at odds with the incremental methods favoured by the Japanese government towards nuclear disarmament. As a result, there is a clear delineation between the Japanese NGO community and government policy making;²⁹³ the Japanese government's sponsorship of the ICNND suggests that the gap between the NGO community and government policy may be closing.

²⁸⁷ Y. Kase, "Japan's Nonnuclear Weapons Policy in the Changing security Environment: Issues, Challenges and Strategies," *World Affairs*, 165, 3, (Winter 2003), p. 124.

²⁸⁸ Y. Kase, "Japan's Nonnuclear Weapons Policy in the Changing Security Environment: Issues, Challenges and Strategies," p. 123.

²⁸⁹ Y. Amano, "A Japanese view on nuclear disarmament," *The Nonproliferation Review*, 9, 1, (Spring 2002), p. 139.

²⁹⁰ M. R. Rublee, "The Threshold States: Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Brazil and Japan," *The Nonproliferation Review*, 17, 1 (March 2010), p. 49.

²⁹¹ D. MacFhionnbhairr, P. Lewis, M. Laker and L. F. Machado, "Constructing a New Agenda," p. 267. States capable of making nuclear weapons but who have eschewed their development, such as Canada, Sweden, South Africa, and Brazil carry significant weight in disarmament advocacy.

²⁹² R. J. Samuels, "Japan's Goldilocks Strategy," p. 113.

²⁹³ A. Difilippo, "Can Japan Craft an International Nuclear Disarmament Policy?" *Asian Survey*, 40, 4 (July-August, 2000), p. 574.

In response to domestic pressures Japan sponsors an annual UNGA resolution '*A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons*' and in 2001 Japan proposed 24 concrete steps towards this objective.²⁹⁴ Again in 2009, Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone outlined 11 disarmament priorities in a speech titled "Conditions towards Zero- 11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament."²⁹⁵ This was followed by a draft resolution submitted to the UNGA on nuclear disarmament titled '*Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons*.'²⁹⁶ These resolutions are routinely adopted by a majority of states, including the United States in 2009; however, this support from the United States was the result of the Obama Administrations policies on nuclear disarmament rather than Japanese influence. These initiatives like the NAC resolutions measure international support and aggregate attention, but do little to develop the norm of nuclear disarmament. Despite Japans investment in the ICNND it appears reluctant to assume a more active role as a norm disarmament norm advocate.

Japanese nuclear (non-proliferation) diplomacy

Beyond these broad principles (or action points), the Japan has emphasised the need for practical and realistic approach to the non-proliferation challenges investing diplomatic and economic resources in a number of specific projects. Japan has placed great importance on and has been a 'strong if not leading advocate of the CTBT,'²⁹⁷ on the early entry into force of the CTBT and universalisation of the CTBT.²⁹⁸ Japan has also given great support to the FMCT negotiations, emphasizing the importance and urgency of the commencement of FMCT.²⁹⁹ In line with a balanced approach, Japan has also been involved in the promotion of the Additional Protocol to IAEA safeguards agreements, which support nuclear security and ultimately create a secure environment for disarmament.³⁰⁰ Japan's diplomatic actions are characterised by economic and technical diplomacy, including support for assistance and sanctions. Japan has provided economic assistance to Russia's denuclearisation efforts.³⁰¹ Japan also provided economic and technical assistance to support the Central Asian Nuclear

²⁹⁴ Y. Amano, "A Japanese view on nuclear disarmament," p. 143.

²⁹⁵ "Japan Today: Japan Unveils 11-Point Initiative to Push Global Disarmament," *Carnegie Proliferation News*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (2009), retrieved February 18, 2010 from <<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/newsletters/pronews/pronews20090428.htm>>..

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ T. Teichiro and A. DiFilippo, "Japan's New Anti-nuclear Policy," *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 4, (January 19, 2009), p. 3.

²⁹⁸ Y. Amano, "A Japanese view on nuclear disarmament," p. 142.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 143.

³⁰¹ Y. Amano, "A Japanese view on nuclear disarmament," p. 143.

Weapons Free Zone in 1999. Additionally, Japan froze economic assistance to India and Pakistan after the tests in 1998 and offered 'a very privileged relationship' and increased economic cooperation with Pakistan if it would sign the CTBT.³⁰² Maria Rost Rublee suggests that technical assistance includes creating space for dialogue in and around the traditional forums.³⁰³ As such Japan established the Tokyo Forum, to facilitate dialogue on the South Asian crisis.

These pragmatic diplomatic strategies are in part the result of Japan's sensitivities to the United States alliance and concerns regarding nuclear disarmament measures that may decrease security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.³⁰⁴ Japan has a number of valid regional security concerns including nuclear proliferation, non-compliance and ballistic missile testing in North Korea, the assertive postures of both China and Russia (both nuclear weapon states),³⁰⁵ and the risk of terrorist attack at sensitive sites from both internal and external threats.³⁰⁶ As such Japanese disarmament diplomacy has largely been constrained by more pressing security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region.³⁰⁷

Japanese engagement in a middle power coalition

The Japanese preference for unilateral disarmament advocacy, economic diplomacy and its reliance on the United States extended nuclear deterrence has put the Japanese position at odds with other pro-disarmament advocates. Moreover, Japan views many of the nuclear disarmament initiatives to be unrealistic and undermine security.³⁰⁸ Japan had been asked, and had refused to join the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) preferring to take an approach that was more "palatable to the NWS, while also assuaging domestic opinion calling for a strong Japanese stance against nuclear weapons."³⁰⁹ While Japan's efforts through the ICNND suggests an increasing domestic consensus and increased investment in disarmament

³⁰² Y. Amano, "A Japanese view on nuclear disarmament," p. 144.

³⁰³ M. Rublee "Disarmament and the Threshold States: Promise or Peril?" panel on The Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament: Implications of the New Momentum for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners*, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA <Not Available>.

³⁰⁴ T. Suto, "Japan's Policy for Global Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," *Abstract of Public Lecture at the Center for Strategic Research*, Tehran, (April 11, 2007), retrieved May 12, 2008 from <<http://www.cpdnp.jp/English/index.htm>>.

³⁰⁵ Y. Kase, "Japan's Nonnuclear Weapons Policy in the Changing Security Environment: Issues, Challenges and Strategies," p. 124.

³⁰⁶ Y. Amano, "A Japanese view on nuclear disarmament," p. 134.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ M. Hanson, "The Advocacy States: Their Normative Role before and after the U.S. Call for Nuclear Elimination," p. 76.

advocacy, given Japan's history of cautious disarmament diplomacy, it seems unlikely that Japan would engage in a middle power coalition.

New Zealand's middle power foreign policy

As a small, geographically isolated state, New Zealand's absence of power, political and economic weight and relative strategic invisibility ensure that this country operates "for the most part below the radar of powerful nations."³¹⁰ It is this limitation in international relations that paradoxically provide the source of advocacy potential. This relative isolation has enabled New Zealand to pursue an independent foreign policy and this anonymity has necessitated a more resourceful, concentrated and pragmatic diplomatic corp.³¹¹ As an advocate of nuclear disarmament, New Zealand carries political and moral credibility on anti-nuclear issues, but given its small size and absence of strategic credibility, it lacks authority on the disarmament issue. Where New Zealand anti-nuclear advocacy had previously focus on domestic and regional concerns, engagement in the NAC provided the New Zealand government with provided the vehicle to advocate for disarmament outside the Pacific region.³¹²

New Zealand is not traditionally associated with the middle power model; however, reference to its small size fails to explain New Zealand's foreign policy aspirations to advance the nuclear disarmament agenda internationally. As a small state, with an albeit large presence in the Pacific, New Zealand is reliant on a stable and secure international environment within which to pursue its national interest and that of its dependents. New Zealand's relative isolation has enabled a reappraisal of contemporary security threats, with a focus on "bio-security and stewardship of the marine environment."³¹³

New Zealand's anti- nuclear advocacy

The NAC provided New Zealand with a vehicle to exert an influence as an international nuclear disarmament advocate. Prior to New Zealand's engagement in the NAC, New Zealand's anti-nuclear diplomacy was primarily focused on national and regional concerns.

³¹⁰ T. O'Brian, *Presence of Mind: New Zealand in the World*, New Zealand institute of International affairs: Wellington, (2001), p. 71.

³¹¹ The forced independence of New Zealand's trade policy is also a driving factor in NZ's independent foreign policy on security issues, including nuclear disarmament policy. As a former colony, the United Kingdom's admission to the European Community and subsequent agricultural protectionism had a significant impact on NZ's trading profile. With the loss of this major market, New Zealand was forced to diversify its trading partners, in doing so, NZ became less dependent on its great power allies. This footnote is unnecessary.

³¹² Focus before had largely been on Pacific issues- testing or domestic legislation.

³¹³ T. O'Brian, *Presence of Mind: New Zealand in the World*, p. 34.

As a norm entrepreneur and NNWS, New Zealand's nuclear policies are shaped largely by the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act, of 1987. This legislation has its origins in a broad, domestic grassroots, civil society and nongovernmental movement and remains virtually entrenched with bipartisan support.³¹⁴ This legislation had a negative impact on New Zealand's relationship with the United States. It resulted in the suspension of the operation of the ANZUS treaty (with respect to NZ) and the cessation of military and intelligence ties. While 'there has been a degree of moderation of some of these measures over the intervening period' however it is this status as a friend which continues to define NZ's relationship with the United States.³¹⁵ This legislation provides New Zealand with some weight on non-nuclear norms; however, it has not influenced the nuclear policies of other states.

New Zealand's international influence in this area has been through the promotion of NWFZs, in particular that 1986 Rarotonga Treaty and South Pacific NWFZ. There are three protocols to the treaty, which have been signed by the five declared nuclear weapons states, while not all of the protocols have been ratified this Treaty substantially limits and prohibits the manufacture, stationing or testing within the Zone. New Zealand remains a supporter of a Southern Hemisphere NWFZ.³¹⁶ These regional initiatives contribute to the anti-nuclear norm, complement disarmament initiatives and influence the nuclear policies of the NWS (through the protocols to the treaties); however, they have not contributed to advancing nuclear disarmament.

New Zealand's recourse to international legal proceedings also carries normative and legal weight, and has the capacity to influence the great powers. The nuclear tests cases at the International Court of Justice addressed French atmospheric testing (1974) and underground testing (1995) in the South Pacific.³¹⁷ The 1974 case ended in dispute, but led to the French

³¹⁴ With an unwritten constitution, no NZ law is supreme or entrenched. See. D. Lange, *Nuclear Free: The New Zealand Way*, Penguin Books, New Zealand, (1990).

³¹⁵ Terrence O'Brian, "Presence of Mind: New Zealand in the World," p. 97.

³¹⁶ G. Kelly, and N. Smith, "Parliamentarians and a Nuclear Weapon Free Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas." *Aotearoa/New Zealand Section of the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament, Briefing paper from the Aotearoa/New Zealand Section of the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament*, (March 16, 2003). retrieved May 30, 2009 from <<http://www.gsinsitute.org/pnnd/issues/ParliamentariansandaNuclearWeaponFreeSouthernHemisphereandAdjacentAreas.htm>>.

³¹⁷ International Court of Justice, *Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) Judgment*, General List No. 58 (December 20, 1974), and *Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France)*, Judgment, General List No. 59 (December 20, 1974).

announcement that it would cease atmospheric testing as the case was pending.³¹⁸ In the context of the 1996 ICJ *Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Use or the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons*³¹⁹ New Zealand took an early position, as one of the only two Western Aligned Nations to Vote in favour of the 1994 UNGA resolution.³²⁰ New Zealand has subsequently cited the Advisory Opinion as “confirmation of the NWS’ obligation to eliminate these weapons and the legitimization of the nuclear disarmament norm.”³²¹ New Zealand referred to this Opinion in its ratification statement to the International Criminal Court (ICC), making an ‘interpretative declaration’ that the indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons meant that their use would constitute a war crime and therefore fall under the jurisdiction if the ICC.³²²

New Zealand in the New Agenda Coalition

New Zealand’s main contribution to the 2000 Review Conference came via its work through the NAC and in particular through the influence of Disarmament Ambassador Clive Pearson, chair of the Subsidiary Body 1 to the Main Committee I (MCI) “tasked with Negotiating nuclear disarmament language for the final draft.”³²³ This “finely balanced” 17-paragraph draft “drew heavily from the NAC working paper on nuclear disarmament, became the operational document for further negotiation on a forward look,” this was particularly important as the Main Committee I’s report on a backward look remained mired in disagreement.³²⁴ Despite the continued presence of the NAC, efforts to advance the agenda were undermined by the disastrous 2005 Review Conference outcome. As such New Zealand’s nuclear diplomacy has been relegated to supporting positions and efforts to reengage the consensus from 2000.

³¹⁸ J. Hippler Bello and P. H. F. Bekker, “Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Courts Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case,” *The American Journal of International Law* 90, 2 (Apr., 1996), p. 280.

³¹⁹ International Court of Justice, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion*, I.C.J. Reports 1996, (July 8, 1996), retrieved February 27, 2010 from <<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b2913d62.html>>.

³²⁰ Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, G.A. res. 49/73, 49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 63, U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994).

³²¹ L. Burford, *Principled Pragmatism: Non-Governmental Influence on New Zealand’s Nuclear disarmament Advocacy 1995-2000*, Master Thesis, University of Canterbury, New Zealand, 2008.

³²² Interpretative declaration made by the Government of New Zealand on ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, *Extract from instrument of ratification, 7 September 2000*, URL: http://gsinstitute.org/pnnd/docs/new_zealand_icc.html, accessed November 13, 2009.

³²³ L. Burford, *Principled Pragmatism: Non-Governmental Influence on New Zealand’s Nuclear disarmament Advocacy 1995-2000*, p. 53.

³²⁴ T. Rauf, “*Arms Control Today*, (July-August 2000), retrieved May 21, 2009 from <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_07-08/raufjulaug>.

As a small state with even less diplomatic resources than the other middle powers in chapter, conservation of diplomatic energy and strategic positioning become more of a priority. Diplomatic position and skills need to be developed and resourced.³²⁵ New Zealand is a consistent and often vocal advocate for the role of international institutions, conference diplomacy, fair negotiations, and equality between states.³²⁶ As a result New Zealand often favours the middle power advocacy model, with broad geographic membership on issues of interest, seeking these multilateral coalitions across a wide range of issues including disarmament, environment, humanitarian intervention, agricultural protectionism, human rights and law of the sea, keeping different company on each of these issues.³²⁷ Consequently New Zealand is well placed to take strong, principled position on nuclear disarmament but is limited by the consequences of its previous endeavours. This history of principled advocacy NZ is considered by many to more 'extreme' than practical and is at odds with many disarmament advocates that prefer to maintain positive diplomatic relations with United States, consequently this has limited the opportunity for New Zealand to engage in coalitions with other middle powers.

New Zealand is likely to invest in future disarmament coalitions, primarily to maintain the reputation as disarmament advocate; however, New Zealand has continued to engage at an international level on many disarmament issues, despite the relative failure of the NAC.³²⁸

Norwegian middle power foreign policy

Norway has emerged as a vocal and active advocate for nuclear disarmament. Norwegian engagement on the nuclear issue originated from security concerns regarding Russia's nuclear program and activities in the Arctic Circle, these nuclear security and environmental concerns prompted the early technical focus Norwegian anti-nuclear efforts during the Cold War. Norway has traditionally maintained an independent and relatively neutral foreign policy and kept a reasonably low profile during this time. Current Norwegian nuclear disarmament diplomacy however, can be attributed to the emergence of Norway as a specialist in the field of conflict mediation. Couple with early support for the human security agenda (and the Lysoen Declaration) and the skilled mediation that Norway demonstrated in

³²⁵ T. O'Brian, "Presence of Mind: New Zealand in the World," p. 34.

³²⁶ D. McKinnon, "New Zealand's Security: 1990 and Beyond," *Paper presented at the 32nd Otago Foreign Policy School*, Otago University, Dunedin, (27 June, 1997).

³²⁷ Terrence O'Brian, "Presence of Mind: New Zealand in the World," p. 149.

³²⁸ In particular New Zealand has supported a dialogue between the US and Russia on de-alerting. See *Reframing Nuclear De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals*, The East West Institute, New York, (2009), retrieved May 28, 2010 from <http://www.ewi.info/reframing_dealert>.

the Oslo accords has been positively reinforced through subsequent invitations to mediate other conflicts by Norway's involvement in the Ottawa and Oslo Processes. As such, Norway's current position on nuclear disarmament has developed out of the increasingly public profile that Norway has developed as an archetypical 'good international citizen.' This engagement has been possible because of Norway's small, highly skilled and activist foreign ministry and close relationships with the NGO community. The nuclear disarmament issue has emerged as a natural fit with the knowledge, resources and networks accumulated through Norway's human security orientated activity. Norwegian diplomacy is characterised by a "judicious blending of the resources of government and the "field experience" garnered at the grassroots level by their NGOs. The close relationship between Norwegian NGOs and the Norwegian government has produced both detailed knowledge and essential channels at many different levels for trust and consensus building."³²⁹

Norwegian nuclear diplomacy

Elements of Norwegian conflict mediation diplomacy (which has typically been behind the scenes, in 'closed-door negotiations') can be seen in Norway's nuclear disarmament advocacy which has historically tended to be out of the public eye. As the 'expert-mediator,' Norway supported the NAC-NWS negotiations at the 2000 NPT RevCon. This closed-door diplomacy is a very different style to that employed in the Ottawa and Oslo Processes, which involved public diplomacy hosting of conferences. Norway hosted the September 1997 'Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-personnel Landmines' in Oslo, which adopted the Convention.³³⁰ As such Norway appears to be as comfortable behind the scenes as it is in public leadership positions. As a result of this previous experience there are a number of options available to Norway, and this has prompted the Norwegian government to seek to draw together the consultative, behind the scenes mediation with the public approach in the field of nuclear disarmament diplomacy.

Evolving the coalition approach

Current Norwegian initiatives emphasise the role of middle power coalition activity including the 7NI discussed previously in Chapter Four. The 7NI has moved beyond the strictly defined advocacy coalition to include cooperative initiatives with NGOs and NWS (the United Kingdom). In addition, Norway has publically voiced an intention to investigate

³²⁹ A. Kelleher and J. L. Taulbee, "Bridging the Gap," *Peace and Change*, 31, 4, (October 2006), p. 481.

³³⁰ R. M. Behringer, "Middle power leadership on the Human Security Agenda," p. 319.

the possibility of take the FMCT outside of the CD calling upon Norwegian experience in the Ottawa and Oslo Processes. Negotiating an FMCT outside of the CD would require an extensive coalition of states to support his move, but would allow the states to focus on areas of agreement, rather having the process remain a hostage to consensus. In a statement to the CD, Hilde Skorpen, Deputy Permanent Representative Norway, stated that

“Norway recognises that there are some crucial differences between the nuclear disarmament agenda and the agenda that led to the ban on landmines and cluster munitions. But there are also similarities. Disarmament is a tool to enhance international, national and human security, for states and for people independent of the agenda or bodies in which we decide to interact.”³³¹

This statement comes very close to the direction of the discussion this thesis, particularly the concluding analysis in Chapter Four. It would appear that the Norwegian foreign ministry proposes that a consensus on the issues is not needed to extend a normative prohibition to states not part to the agreement.

Conclusions:

Despite being western and ostensibly pro-disarmament, this brief analysis of the nuclear policies of these four states reveals that there is a wide variety of approaches favoured. These states invested in niche roles that reflect their geographic and political positions. This specialisation has enabled these Canada and Japan to exert an influence on issues without compromising their relationship with the United States. While, all of these states have engaged in disarmament advocacy as individual states, Canada and Japan demonstrate a preference for this unilateral approach as it draws less attention from the NWS. These states are unlikely to engage in middle power coalitions because of the dominance of their relationships to the great powers in their regions. The nuclear disarmament diplomacy of these states appears to be more static, in that they repeatedly used the same platform. For example the Japanese UNGA resolution or Canada’s working papers in the RevCon cycle. For various reasons (including great power pressure, domestic politics and pressing security

³³¹ H. Skorpen, Deputy Permanent Representative Norway, *Statement to the CD* (February 18, 2010), retrieved February 21, 2010 from http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/2010/statements/part1/18Feb_Norway.pdf.

concerns) these states have not committed to moving their positions on nuclear disarmament forward.

In comparison, New Zealand and Norway view disarmament advocacy vehicle to claim a greater international presence. These states have developed reasonably independent foreign policies and are subsequently less constrained in the choice of strategy. Moreover, the foreign policies that these states pursue have been reinforced either from domestic support or international recognition. Where there is no positive feedback or the policies find resistance these middle powers have been very quick to change track. The anti-nuclear or disarmament advocacy of these states demonstrates a progression of increasingly sophisticated actions. New Zealand established a reputation as a principled actor as has moved from a primarily domestic and regional focus, to utilise a number of forums to advocate for the anti-nuclear position (including the ICJ, NWFZ and the NAC) and New Zealand has invest in developing expertise at an international level, or supporting international level initiatives. Norway has demonstrated a similar progression taking the technical competence on nuclear security issues and experience gained in conflict mediation and human security initiatives, translating this dynamic into the nuclear disarmament context.

Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

This chapter will draw together the conclusions from this research to outline a series of recommendations that can be applied to future middle power nuclear disarmament coalitions. As a starting point, Chapter Three identified the factors that determined the NAC influence on NWS decision-making at the 2000 RevCon. As John Simpson has suggested, the main contribution of the NAC was the structural and organisational approach taken.³³² Chapter Three also identified the reasons why the influence of the NAC was ultimately limited. This coalition failed to: (1) define specific objectives, policies or deliverables at the outset, (2) maintain momentum, (3) implement progress (based on commitments and agreement undertaken), (4) maintain internal cohesion within the coalition, (5) guarantee the longevity of the coalition to ensure a consistent presence, (6) frame both the issues and the solutions with due regard to the operating environment. The ‘coalition’ hypothesis of this thesis has been supported by the fact that middle power states have used the coalition platform to generate momentum on a broad spectrum of disarmament initiatives, contributing to nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons disarmament with varying degree of success. These coalitions demonstrated a broad range of strategies available to middle power states that employ the coalition approach. This chapter will address a number of these strategies that could be used to remedy the shortcomings identified in the NAC example.

The template of moderator variables: analysing diplomatic strategies

This research was framed by a template of moderator variables which determined the relationship between the coalition approach and the success of the middle power states as norm entrepreneurs. These moderator variables are also useful as framework to categorise potential coalition strategies.

1) The capacity of the norm entrepreneurs to demonstrate leadership

The capacity of the norm entrepreneurs to demonstrate leadership is largely reliant on the structure and the membership of the coalition. This research has covered a full spectrum of middle power cooperative activity from state-led coalitions to state-sponsored international commissions and transnational advocacy networks; however, a number of the cases involved a combination of strategies including partnerships between middle powers, NGOs and NWS (such as the United Kingdom). The possible coalition structures identified in the preceding

³³² J. Simpson, “Nuclear Arms Control: Appendix 6B. The 2000 NPT Review Conference,” p. 488.

research includes: (1) a formalised core group of middle power states, (2) a flexible or ad hoc membership arrangement, (3) a break-out group or subgroups to focus on particular areas of concern, (4) the clear division labour amongst member of the coalition, (5) consultation or liaison arrangements with other like-minded middle powers, NGOs or NWS or (6) partnerships with NWS or transnational advocacy networks.

Closely related to the organisational structure of the coalition is the choice of the coalition operating environment. Again there is a variety of operational level strategies available including: (1) conference diplomacy in the UN sponsored forums such as the RevCon Process or the CD, (2) a series of conferences designed to support the operation of the traditional forums, (3) a fast-track, goal-orientated Ottawa and Oslo-style Process, (4) independent initiatives that focus on technical or conceptual issues, or (4) a strategy that appropriates the successful elements of the previous examples.

2) The constraints of the international environment

The success of middle power coalition advocacy is dependent on the complex interplay between the operating environments, dominant norms, coalition strategies and the domestic situations of the states themselves. In a hostile international environment, middle power advocacy is severely curtailed. The middle power coalitions investigated in the preceding chapters have demonstrated some capacity to tailor their advocacy to mitigate the constraining influence of the international system. Even in hostile conditions, many of these initiatives took steps to create an environment that will support the implementation of disarmament, at the very least create space for negotiations or identify the middle ground.³³³ The capacity of the coalition to mitigate constraints is largely dependent on the accurate assessment of the international situation (complementary and competing norms, and the security priorities of the states involved). Most importantly, these coalitions are successful where the states have assessed that coalition could reasonably assert an influence as the coalition is ultimately dependent on a receptive international environment. As discussed in Chapter Four, pragmatic middle power advocacy will take these limitations into account and work around them rather than against them. In particular, middle power states have complemented their diplomacy by developing partnerships with NGOs, facilitating dialogue or working on the technical aspects of disarmament that impede progress.

³³³ S. Kongstad, "Seminar: A Nordic Initiative for Nuclear Abolition," p. 4.

3) The characteristics of the issue.

In each case study, the effectiveness of the coalition advocacy has been determined by the degree to which the middle power advocates have addressed the specific characteristics unique to the disarmament issue. This involves identifying and framing the problem and developing clear policy solutions to match this demand. Where the characteristics (such as the utility of the weapon, the replacement value, the norms that guide behaviour regime, the institutions already in place and characteristics of possession and use) are complicated, disputed or unclear, the middle power coalition's influence has been limited. Each weapons category is subject to very different characteristics; however, the approach to determining strategy that is most appropriate is same. Middle power coalition would benefit from addressing specific issue areas that can be addressed by a single, uniformly applicable norm. Again, these states must be mindful of limitations and strategise accordingly.

4) The framing the issue and the development of the case for disarmament by norm entrepreneurs.

As the case studies demonstrate, middle power coalitions have an advantage where they can frame the debate, the issue and develop a strong case for disarmament by producing a viable policy solution. There are a number of ways to develop or isolate an appropriate policy solution. In particular, the middle power states which drew on precedent or created a package of policies within in a framework tended to be more effective. In reality however, a number of middle power coalitions (the 7NI, JACKSNNZ and the SALW examples) focused on activities that would precede norm advocacy such as preparing a positive environment for negotiations or policy formation rather than directing policy from the outset (such as in the case of the NAC, NATO-5, Ottawa and Oslo processes). In either situation the organised coalition has proved to be a useful vehicle to raise the visibility of the issue, in some cases putting the issue of disarmament on the international agenda.

The selection of the most optimal coalition strategy is dependent on the objectives of the coalition (to achieve longevity, develop momentum, capture international interest, provide a forum for negotiations, promote a specific policy, the middle ground or advocate for broad principles). While there are a range of options available to middle power states, some strategies are more suited to particular objectives than others. The capacity of the middle power states to remain flexible and to 'pick and choose' a strategy that best suits the context is paramount. Similarly, the coalition's capacity to retain control over the direction of the

coalition initiative and to define the role, policy positions and objectives is also important. As Ronald Behringer has suggested, given the right combination of strategies, middle power coalitions may be able to overcome the domestic and international challenges decrease great power opposition to the advocacy issue.³³⁴

Future middle power coalitions

Given the relative success of the Ottawa and Oslo Processes, some NGO and state actors have raised the idea of a similar effort in the nuclear field. As discussed in Chapter Six, Norway in particular, is considering the possibility of a similar approach to conclude negotiations an FMCT outside of the CD.³³⁵ This thesis has considered the question of whether future middle power nuclear disarmament coalition activity is feasible and desirable. In the absence of viable policies, international consensus on long term strategy, and the political and strategic conditions that would enable disarmament to succeed, this is a conversation that is worth having. Future middle power advocates of nuclear disarmament must be mindful however, as developing momentum on nuclear disarmament and transforming political will into concrete outcomes is an onerous task. Progress towards this objective involves reducing both the level of armaments and reliance on these weapons in security policies. Influence on these issues has been beyond the scope of the middle power states. Instead, as the NWS have argued it is just as necessary to implement the conditions that would enable such reductions to have a positive impact on international security. While this may not include the direct advocacy of the nuclear disarmament norm, this is an area where middle power could make a contribution.

The recommendations: a full spectrum of potential middle power action.

The following recommendations suggest a range, or spectrum of possible options applicable for future middle power activity in the context of current nuclear disarmament dynamics derived from the previous examples. In ascending order of complexity, the recommendations are as follows:

- 1) An informal or ad hoc effort

Similar to the NATO-5 effort, an informal coalition of middle powers could focus on a specific issue, to generate short term momentum. An ad hoc coalition of this kind would

³³⁴ R. M. Behringer, "Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda," p. 305.

³³⁵ In particular the Norwegian Foreign Ministry is considering this issue. H. Skorpen, *Statement to the CD*.

operate on the periphery of a traditional forum (for example the CD or a RevCon) to take advantage of an opportunity when it arises. This sort of activity could provide a much needed 'boost' to put an issue in the agenda or resolve end-stage negotiations. There are a number of substantive and procedural issues that require a catalyst to gain momentum. Middle power states could identify any one of these; however, preferable one in which they have a vested interest and authority. Possible issues could include NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, the tactical nuclear weapons issue, or CTBT ratifications.

- 2) An informal coalition that aims to conclude a consensus agreement on a middle ground issue

This approach would be similar in style to the NAC between 1998 and 2000. This initiative would involve some policy development and but would focus on the skill of the member state at conference diplomacy. The middle power states would be better placed if the coalition could identify the middle ground ahead of time and engage in preparatory diplomacy in the lead up to the formal negotiations. An initiative like this would be useful in the context of the 2010 RevCon as 'coalitions of consent' are particularly when concluding a successful outcome.³³⁶ Given the high expectation held by many states parties that this 2010 will be a success, there is a keen need to focus on areas of agreement, rather than the areas of difference.³³⁷ An informal coalition of this type would better to address a few specific issues of concern and adopt a flexible position on these issues so as to avoid the damaging consequences of internal divisions. This coalition could benefit from a partnership with a transnational network to reduce the resource investment; however, such a coalition may be better suited to performing a more functional role (such as conference diplomacy and negotiations) rather than advocate for a policy position.

- 3) Formalised coalition that aims to create an environment that will support further advocacy (an 'enabling international environment',³³⁸)

³³⁶ J. Duncan, UK Ambassador for Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament, *Interview from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the 2010 Review Conference at Wilton Park, (Monday 14 - Friday 18, December 2009)*, retrieved January 12, 2010 from

<http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/highlights/viewstory.aspx?url=/wp_129080307681656250.html>.

³³⁷ S. Burke, US Special Representative for Non Proliferation, *Interview from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the 2010 Review Conference at Wilton Park, (December 14-18, 2009)* retrieved December 20, 2009 from <http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/highlights/viewstory.aspx?url=/wp_129080307681656250.html>.

³³⁸ S. Kongstad, "Seminar: A Nordic Initiative for Nuclear Abolition," p. 4.

This effort aims for the long term approach, more along the lines of the 7NI or JACKSNNZ efforts. These efforts aim to create an ‘enabling environment’³³⁹ will prepare the ground for states that possess nuclear weapons to implement disarmament measures. This involves the formal coalition address the verification, legal and political conditions required for future disarmament efforts to succeed. Middle power states could articulate and demonstrate the feasibility of the phased reduction of nuclear weapons, through investing in cooperative activities such as the United Kingdom-Norway-VERTIC verification initiative. Middle powers can identify and demonstrate new strategies or policy options to ‘lead by example.’ This coalition may benefit from the formal division of labour, allowing state to pursue individual project under the umbrella of the coalition. Such efforts could focus on strengthening the RevCon process or other non-proliferation regime agreements. This coalition should refrain from advocating for broad norms, in favour of promoting technical policy solutions.

- 4) A formal coalition that operates outside the traditional forums to advocate for a specific issue or cluster of issues, similar to a limited Ottawa/ Oslo Style Process

A middle power coalition could focus an advocacy campaign on a specific disarmament related issue, an element of an international agreement, or new agreement to support the RevCon process or the CD. This focus would be on an incremental objective that could be the subject of a single, uniform norm. The advocacy coalition would need to identify the policy solution at the outset. This coalition would need to involve core group of committed states, and develop partnerships with the NGO community and other supportive states. This approach is a step further than the coalition activity described in option (2) above because it involves a more formalised campaign. This campaign could take place within the existing institutional framework. Alternatively, this campaign could operate like the Ottawa and Oslo processes and convene a series of conferences, however such a campaign would benefit from operating parallel to the traditional forums so that the outcomes or momentum generated could be translated across. This process could begin by focusing on facilitating dialogue (like the SALW coalition conferences) and evolve into an Ottawa/ Oslo style process further down the track (if supportive conditions exist).

Adopting an Ottawa/ Oslo-style process would require the development of a formal relationship with a transnational advocacy network and would benefit from formal

³³⁹ Ibid.

relationships with other states including the great powers. This approach could be adopted to cement progress on an immediate step, group of steps, or a plan of action for the next review cycle. Moreover, a limited Ottawa/ Oslo style process could develop an auxiliary agreement to address any number discrete issues. The Norwegian suggestion regarding the FMCT negotiations would fit into this approach. In addition, this style of coalition could advocate for a short treaty to address the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapon. This would effectively introduce a ban on the use of the weapons, (rather than a comprehensive disarmament treaty) and would not require additional verification capabilities or disarmament efforts on the part of the NWS. Instead this would create a normative prohibition against the weapons use, clarify the ambiguous language in the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion and provide a starting point for the future process to dismantle the nuclear weapons themselves. As a part of the ratification process for this agreement, state signatories could include declare as part of national legislation, that the use of nuclear weapons would be treated as a crime against humanity.³⁴⁰

Ottawa/Oslo style process could also be useful to introduce an amendment to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to extend the definition of ‘crimes against humanity’ to include the use of a nuclear weapon.³⁴¹ This would require an orchestrated advocacy campaign centred on the Review Conference of the Rome Statute, scheduled to be held in Kampala, Uganda in 2010 or in a subsequent Review. This option, does not guarantee the extension of the prohibition to states that are not signatories (to the Rome Statute). But it again it could provide a useful starting point for disarmament negotiations, and may influence outlying states.³⁴² Such efforts, which rely on agreement rather than consensus may not substantially alter the status quo; however, it would raise the profile of the disarmament issue and contribute (at least in a normative sense) to delegitimizing and devaluing the weapons. Such initiatives could prepare the ground for a change in NWS nuclear postures.

5) An Ottawa/Oslo style process to conclude a nuclear disarmament convention.

At the end of the spectrum of possible middle power coalition activity, these states could launch an Ottawa/Oslo style process to conclude a nuclear disarmament convention. This is an option that has already been discounted in this thesis (see discussion in chapter five). The

³⁴⁰ R. Johnson, “Security Assurances for Everyone: A New Approach to Deterring the Use of Nuclear Weapons,” *Disarmament Diplomacy* 90 (Spring, 2009), p.7.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Ibid.

negotiation is seen by many to be the only option to fulfil the requirements of Article VI of the NPT. Indeed as the NAC declared in 1998 the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear weapons free world would require “...*the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.*”³⁴³ More recently the United Nations Secretary General’s Five Point Plan included a provision for an agreement or framework of agreements to this end, and reference to this was included in the draft 2009 NPT Prep Com documents. In addition, Austria, Costa Rica, India and Malaysia have indicated their support for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.³⁴⁴ Regardless of the arguments for and against a nuclear weapons convention (or framework of disarmament agreements), a process lead by middle powers in this direction would not be feasible or desirable in the foreseeable future. Middle powers are better equipped to focus on short term and achievable aims and prepare the ground for later disarmament momentum.

Research limitations

This research has ultimately been limited on a number of fronts. Detailed analysis has been lost in an attempt to cover a broad range of middle power coalitions. Therefore future research could consider the drivers of middle power state disarmament advocacy and the coalition strategies in more detail. This thesis proposed that middle power states are more effective when acting in coalition rather than individual efforts and that this coalition activity is both reasonable and likely; however as Chapter Six suggests, not all middle power states tend towards this type of diplomatic engagement. Future research could consider other disarmament strategies (outside of the coalition), the individual contribution of middle powers to nuclear disarmament. Despite the case built in this thesis, there are other options for middle powers. Ko Colijn, in a discussion of middle power efforts in the WMD regimes in the past decade, suggests that “the gains from acting in concert in permanent institutions- and in particular negotiated rather than imposed ones - may far exceed the gains from the ad hoc success of small or medium powers acting solo or in the framework of ad hoc coalitions.”³⁴⁵ Furthermore, he suggests that middle powers are best able to play a role

³⁴³ New Agenda Coalition, *Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World - the Need for a New*

³⁴⁴ “General and complete disarmament: follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*,” United Nations First Committee, Sixty-second session (October 2006) submitted by Algeria, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Singapore, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand and Viet Nam.

through plurilateral initiatives to ‘augment’ permanent institutions, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.³⁴⁶

Conclusion

This thesis set out to consider whether middle power states, such as those involved in the NAC, were effective advocates of the emerging international norm of nuclear disarmament when acting in coalition with other like-minded middle powers. This thesis found that the influence of middle power nuclear disarmament advocates is ultimately constrained by the dynamics of international politics. Thesis built a case to support the hypothesis by suggesting that the NAC is one example of a larger trend in international disarmament diplomacy of using middle power coalitions to generate disarmament momentum. Using a template of moderator variables as a guide for analysis this research identified and compared the various diplomatic strategies employed in these initiatives and assessed the capacity of these states to develop the case for nuclear disarmament, persuasively reject or rebut opposing arguments, and constrain the nuclear policies of more powerful states. This thesis found that the coalition approach has been widely useful platform for middle power advocacy and that within certain clearly defined parameters these strategies could be applicable in the context of nuclear disarmament. The primary contribution of this research however, has been the identification of the factors that future middle power coalitions should take into account when engaging in disarmament advocacy.

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